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    SubjectRe: [PATCH v3] fs: allow protected cross-uid sticky symlinks
    On Tue, Jun 01, 2010 at 02:07:34PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
    > > I don't buy it. If we are concerned about the symlinks in the middle of
    > > pathname, your checks are useless (mkdir /tmp/a, ln -s whatever /tmp/a/b,
    > > have victim open /tmp/a/b/something). If we are not, then your checks are
    > > in the wrong place.
    > Well, that's not traditionally where the problems happen, but I have no
    > problem strengthening the protection to include a full examination of the
    > entire path looking for sticky/world-writable directories.
    > If not, what is the right place for the checks?

    Handling of trailing symlink on open(). At most. And I wouldn't be
    surprised if the real answer turns out to include "... if we have
    O_CREAT in flags", but that needs to be determined.

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