Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sun, 30 May 2010 16:01:53 +0300 | From | Avi Kivity <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH] VFIO driver: Non-privileged user level PCI drivers |
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On 05/30/2010 03:49 PM, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > On Sun, May 30, 2010 at 03:27:05PM +0300, Avi Kivity wrote: > >> On 05/30/2010 03:19 PM, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: >> >>> On Fri, May 28, 2010 at 04:07:38PM -0700, Tom Lyon wrote: >>> >>> >>>> The VFIO "driver" is used to allow privileged AND non-privileged processes to >>>> implement user-level device drivers for any well-behaved PCI, PCI-X, and PCIe >>>> devices. >>>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lyon<pugs@cisco.com> >>>> --- >>>> This patch is the evolution of code which was first proposed as a patch to >>>> uio/uio_pci_generic, then as a more generic uio patch. Now it is taken entirely >>>> out of the uio framework, and things seem much cleaner. Of course, there is >>>> a lot of functional overlap with uio, but the previous version just seemed >>>> like a giant mode switch in the uio code that did not lead to clarity for >>>> either the new or old code. >>>> >>>> >>> IMO this was because this driver does two things: programming iommu and >>> handling interrupts. uio does interrupt handling. >>> We could have moved iommu / DMA programming to >>> a separate driver, and have uio work with it. >>> This would solve limitation of the current driver >>> that is needs an iommu domain per device. >>> >>> >> How do we enforce security then? We need to ensure that unprivileged >> users can only use the device with an iommu. >> > Force assigning to iommu before we allow any other operation? >
That means the driver must be aware of the iommu.
-- error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function
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