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Subject[014/117] reiserfs: fix permissions on .reiserfs_priv
2.6.33-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------
From: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>

commit cac36f707119b792b2396aed371d6b5cdc194890 upstream.

Commit 677c9b2e393a0cd203bd54e9c18b012b2c73305a ("reiserfs: remove
privroot hiding in lookup") removed the magic from the lookup code to hide
the .reiserfs_priv directory since it was getting loaded at mount-time
instead. The intent was that the entry would be hidden from the user via
a poisoned d_compare, but this was faulty.

This introduced a security issue where unprivileged users could access and
modify extended attributes or ACLs belonging to other users, including
root.

This patch resolves the issue by properly hiding .reiserfs_priv. This was
the intent of the xattr poisoning code, but it appears to have never
worked as expected. This is fixed by using d_revalidate instead of
d_compare.

This patch makes -oexpose_privroot a no-op. I'm fine leaving it this way.
The effort involved in working out the corner cases wrt permissions and
caching outweigh the benefit of the feature.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Acked-by: Edward Shishkin <edward.shishkin@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Matt McCutchen <matt@mattmccutchen.net>
Tested-by: Matt McCutchen <matt@mattmccutchen.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

---
fs/reiserfs/dir.c | 2 --
fs/reiserfs/xattr.c | 17 ++++-------------
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/reiserfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/reiserfs/dir.c
@@ -45,8 +45,6 @@ static inline bool is_privroot_deh(struc
struct reiserfs_de_head *deh)
{
struct dentry *privroot = REISERFS_SB(dir->d_sb)->priv_root;
- if (reiserfs_expose_privroot(dir->d_sb))
- return 0;
return (dir == dir->d_parent && privroot->d_inode &&
deh->deh_objectid == INODE_PKEY(privroot->d_inode)->k_objectid);
}
--- a/fs/reiserfs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/reiserfs/xattr.c
@@ -976,21 +976,13 @@ int reiserfs_permission(struct inode *in
return generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL);
}

-/* This will catch lookups from the fs root to .reiserfs_priv */
-static int
-xattr_lookup_poison(struct dentry *dentry, struct qstr *q1, struct qstr *name)
+static int xattr_hide_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
- struct dentry *priv_root = REISERFS_SB(dentry->d_sb)->priv_root;
- if (container_of(q1, struct dentry, d_name) == priv_root)
- return -ENOENT;
- if (q1->len == name->len &&
- !memcmp(q1->name, name->name, name->len))
- return 0;
- return 1;
+ return -EPERM;
}

static const struct dentry_operations xattr_lookup_poison_ops = {
- .d_compare = xattr_lookup_poison,
+ .d_revalidate = xattr_hide_revalidate,
};

int reiserfs_lookup_privroot(struct super_block *s)
@@ -1004,8 +996,7 @@ int reiserfs_lookup_privroot(struct supe
strlen(PRIVROOT_NAME));
if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
REISERFS_SB(s)->priv_root = dentry;
- if (!reiserfs_expose_privroot(s))
- s->s_root->d_op = &xattr_lookup_poison_ops;
+ dentry->d_op = &xattr_lookup_poison_ops;
if (dentry->d_inode)
dentry->d_inode->i_flags |= S_PRIVATE;
} else



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