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Subject[PATCH 3/3] p9auth: add p9auth driver
This is a driver that adds Plan 9 style capability device
implementation. See Documentation/p9auth.txt for a description
of how to use this.

This driver allows the implementation of completely unprivileged
login daemons. However, doing so requires a fundamental change
regarding linux userids: a server privileged with the new
CAP_GRANT_ID capability can create a one-time setuid capability
allowing another process to change to one specific new userid.
This is a change which must be discussed. The use of this
privilege can be completely prevented by having init remove
CAP_GRANT_ID from its capability bounding set before forking any
processes.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
Documentation/p9auth.txt | 47 ++++
drivers/char/Kconfig | 2 +
drivers/char/Makefile | 2 +
drivers/char/p9auth/Kconfig | 9 +
drivers/char/p9auth/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/char/p9auth/p9auth.c | 517 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 578 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/p9auth.txt
create mode 100644 drivers/char/p9auth/Kconfig
create mode 100644 drivers/char/p9auth/Makefile
create mode 100644 drivers/char/p9auth/p9auth.c
diff --git a/Documentation/p9auth.txt b/Documentation/p9auth.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14a69d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/p9auth.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+The p9auth device driver implements a plan-9 factotum-like
+capability API. Tasks which are privileged (authorized by
+possession of the CAP_GRANT_ID privilege (POSIX capability))
+can write new capabilities to /dev/caphash. The kernel then
+stores these until a task uses them by writing to the
+/dev/capuse device. Each capability represents the ability
+for a task running as userid X to switch to userid Y and
+some set of groups. Each capability may be used only once,
+and unused capabilities are cleared after two minutes.
+
+The following examples shows how to use the API. Shell 1
+contains a privileged root shell. Shell 2 contains an
+unprivileged shell as user 501 in the same user namespace. If
+not already done, the privileged shell should create the p9auth
+devices:
+
+ majfile=/sys/module/p9auth/parameters/cap_major
+ minfile=/sys/module/p9auth/parameters/cap_minor
+ maj=`cat $majfile`
+ mknod /dev/caphash c $maj 0
+ min=`cat $minfile`
+ mknod /dev/capuse c $maj 1
+ chmod ugo+w /dev/capuse
+
+Now shell 2 somehow communicates to shell 1 that it possesses
+valid login credentials to switch to userid 502. Shell 2 then
+looks up the groups which uid 502 is a member of, and builds
+a capability string to pass to the kernel. It does this by
+concatenating the old userid, new userid, new primary group,
+number of auxiliary groups, and each auxiliary group, all
+as integers separated by '@'. The resulting string is hashed
+with a random string. In our example, userid 501 may transition
+to userid 502, with primary group 502 and auxiliary group 29.
+
+ capstr="501@502@502@1@29"
+ echo -n "$capstr" > /tmp/txtfile
+ randstr=`dd if=/dev/urandom count=1 2>/dev/null | \
+ uuencode -m - | head -n 2 | tail -n 1 | cut -c -8 `
+ openssl sha1 -hmac "$randstr" /tmp/txtfile | awk '{ print $2 '} \
+ > /tmp/hex
+ ./unhex < /tmp/hex > /dev/caphash
+
+The source for unhex.c can be found in the ltp testsuite under
+ltp-dev/testcases/kernel/security/p9auth. To shell 2 it passes $capstr
+and $randstr. Shell 2 can then transition to the new userid by doing
+
+ echo -n "$capstr@$randstr" > /dev/capuse
diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig
index 3141dd3..e7ff2a9 100644
--- a/drivers/char/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig
@@ -1113,5 +1113,7 @@ config DEVPORT

source "drivers/s390/char/Kconfig"

+source "drivers/char/p9auth/Kconfig"
+
endmenu

diff --git a/drivers/char/Makefile b/drivers/char/Makefile
index f957edf..3c27905 100644
--- a/drivers/char/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/Makefile
@@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PS3_FLASH) += ps3flash.o
obj-$(CONFIG_JS_RTC) += js-rtc.o
js-rtc-y = rtc.o

+obj-$(CONFIG_PLAN9AUTH) += p9auth/
+
# Files generated that shall be removed upon make clean
clean-files := consolemap_deftbl.c defkeymap.c

diff --git a/drivers/char/p9auth/Kconfig b/drivers/char/p9auth/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d1c66d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/p9auth/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+config PLAN9AUTH
+ tristate "Plan 9 style capability device implementation"
+ default n
+ depends on CRYPTO
+ help
+ This module implements the Plan 9 style capability device.
+
+ To compile this driver as a module, choose
+ M here: the module will be called p9auth.
diff --git a/drivers/char/p9auth/Makefile b/drivers/char/p9auth/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ebf6ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/p9auth/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+obj-$(CONFIG_PLAN9AUTH) += p9auth.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/p9auth/p9auth.c b/drivers/char/p9auth/p9auth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d14f709
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/p9auth/p9auth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,517 @@
+/*
+ * Plan 9 style capability device implementation for the Linux Kernel
+ *
+ * Copyright 2008, 2009 Ashwin Ganti <ashwin.ganti@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Released under the GPLv2
+ *
+ */
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/cdev.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+
+#ifndef CAP_MAJOR
+#define CAP_MAJOR 0
+#endif
+
+#ifndef CAP_NR_DEVS
+#define CAP_NR_DEVS 2 /* caphash and capuse */
+#endif
+
+#ifndef CAP_NODE_SIZE
+#define CAP_NODE_SIZE 20
+#endif
+
+#define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 20
+
+struct cap_node {
+ char data[CAP_NODE_SIZE];
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns;
+ unsigned long time_created;
+ struct list_head list;
+};
+
+#define CAP_HASH_COUNT_LIM 4000 /* make configurable sometime */
+/*
+ * cap_list, the list of valid capability tokens
+ * todo: put into user_namespace
+ */
+static LIST_HEAD(cap_list);
+static int cap_hash_count; /* number of entries cap_list */
+DEFINE_MUTEX(cap_mutex); /* TODO fix up the locking one day */
+
+struct cap_dev {
+ struct cdev cdev;
+};
+
+static int cap_major = CAP_MAJOR;
+static int cap_minor;
+
+module_param(cap_major, int, S_IRUGO);
+module_param(cap_minor, int, S_IRUGO);
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Ashwin Ganti");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+static struct cap_dev *cap_devices;
+
+static void hexdump(unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
+{
+ while (len--)
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "%02x", *buf++);
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "\n");
+}
+
+static char *cap_hash(char *plain_text, unsigned int plain_text_size,
+ char *key, unsigned int key_size)
+{
+ struct scatterlist sg;
+ char *result;
+ struct crypto_hash *tfm;
+ struct hash_desc desc;
+ int ret;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_hash("hmac(sha1)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "failed to load transform for hmac(sha1): %ld\n",
+ PTR_ERR(tfm));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ desc.tfm = tfm;
+ desc.flags = 0;
+
+ result = kzalloc(MAX_DIGEST_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!result) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "out of memory!\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ sg_set_buf(&sg, plain_text, plain_text_size);
+
+ ret = crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, key, key_size);
+ if (ret) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "setkey() failed ret=%d\n", ret);
+ kfree(result);
+ result = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = crypto_hash_digest(&desc, &sg, plain_text_size, result);
+ if (ret) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "digest () failed ret=%d\n", ret);
+ kfree(result);
+ result = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "crypto hash digest size %d\n",
+ crypto_hash_digestsize(tfm));
+ hexdump(result, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+out:
+ crypto_free_hash(tfm);
+ return result;
+}
+
+static int cap_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ struct cap_dev *dev;
+ dev = container_of(inode->i_cdev, struct cap_dev, cdev);
+ filp->private_data = dev;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct id_set {
+ char *source_user, *target_user;
+ uid_t old_uid, new_uid;
+ gid_t new_gid;
+ unsigned int ngroups;
+ struct group_info *newgroups;
+ char *full; /* The full entry which must be freed */
+};
+
+/*
+ * read an entry. For now it is
+ * source_user@target_user@rand
+ * Next it will become
+ * source_user@target_user@target_group@numgroups@grp1..@grpn@rand
+ */
+static int parse_user_capability(char *s, struct id_set *set)
+{
+ char *tmp, *tmpu;
+ int i, ret;
+ unsigned long res;
+
+ /*
+ * break the supplied string into tokens with @ as the
+ * delimiter If the string is "user1@user2@randomstring" we
+ * need to split it and hash 'user1@user2' using 'randomstring'
+ * as the key.
+ */
+ tmpu = set->full = kstrdup(s, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tmpu)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ set->source_user = strsep(&tmpu, "@");
+ set->target_user = strsep(&tmpu, "@");
+ tmp = strsep(&tmpu, "@");
+ if (!set->source_user || !set->target_user || !tmp)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (strict_strtoul(set->target_user, 0, &res))
+ goto out;
+ set->new_uid = (uid_t) res;
+ if (strict_strtoul(set->source_user, 0, &res))
+ goto out;
+ set->old_uid = (uid_t) res;
+ if (strict_strtoul(tmp, 0, &res))
+ goto out;
+ set->new_gid = (gid_t) res;
+
+ tmp = strsep(&tmpu, "@");
+ if (!tmp)
+ goto out;
+ if (sscanf(tmp, "%d", &set->ngroups) != 1 || set->ngroups < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ set->newgroups = groups_alloc(set->ngroups);
+ if (!set->newgroups)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ for (i = 0; i < set->ngroups; i++) {
+ gid_t g;
+
+ tmp = strsep(&tmpu, "@");
+ if (!tmp || sscanf(tmp, "%d", &g) != 1) {
+ groups_free(set->newgroups);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ GROUP_AT(set->newgroups, i) = g;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+ kfree(set->full);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int grant_id(struct id_set *set)
+{
+ struct cred *new;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Check whether the process writing to capuse
+ * is actually owned by the source owner
+ */
+ if (set->old_uid != current_uid()) {
+ printk(KERN_ALERT
+ "p9auth: process %d may switch from uid %d to %d, "
+ " but is uid %d (denied).\n", current->pid,
+ set->old_uid, set->new_uid, current_uid());
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Change uid, euid, and fsuid. The suid remains for
+ * flexibility - though I'm torn as to the tradeoff of
+ * usefulness vs. danger in that.
+ */
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = set_groups(new, set->newgroups);
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = cred_setresgid(new, set->new_gid, set->new_gid,
+ set->new_gid, CRED_SETID_FORCE);
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = cred_setresuid(new, set->new_uid, set->new_uid,
+ set->new_uid, CRED_SETID_FORCE);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ commit_creds(new);
+ else
+ abort_creds(new);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Delete a capability entry from the list */
+static void del_cap_node(struct cap_node *node)
+{
+ list_del(&node->list);
+ put_user_ns(node->user_ns);
+ kfree(node);
+ cap_hash_count--;
+}
+
+/* Expose this through sysctl eventually? 2 min timeout for hashes */
+static int cap_timeout = 120;
+
+/* Remove unused entries older tha (cap_timeout) seconds */
+static void remove_old_entries(void)
+{
+ struct cap_node *node, *tmp;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(node, tmp, &cap_list, list)
+ if (node->time_created + HZ * cap_timeout < jiffies)
+ del_cap_node(node);
+}
+
+/*
+ * There are CAP_HASH_COUNT_LIM (4k) entries -
+ * trim the 5 oldest even though newer than cap_timeout
+ */
+static void trim_oldest_entries(void)
+{
+ struct cap_node *node, *tmp;
+ int i = 0;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(node, tmp, &cap_list, list) {
+ if (++i > 5)
+ break;
+ del_cap_node(node);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a capability hash entry to the list - called by the
+ * privileged factotum server. Called with cap_mutex held.
+ */
+static int add_caphash_entry(char *user_buf, size_t count)
+{
+ struct cap_node *node_ptr;
+
+ if (count > CAP_NODE_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (!capable(CAP_GRANT_ID))
+ return -EPERM;
+ node_ptr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cap_node), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!node_ptr)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "Capability being written to /dev/caphash :\n");
+ hexdump(user_buf, count);
+ memcpy(node_ptr->data, user_buf, count);
+ node_ptr->user_ns = get_user_ns(current_user_ns());
+ node_ptr->time_created = jiffies;
+ list_add(&(node_ptr->list), &(cap_list));
+ cap_hash_count++;
+ remove_old_entries();
+ if (cap_hash_count > CAP_HASH_COUNT_LIM)
+ trim_oldest_entries();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use a capability hash entry from the list - called by the
+ * unprivileged login daemon. Called with cap_mutex held.
+ */
+static int use_caphash_entry(char *ubuf)
+{
+ struct cap_node *node;
+ struct id_set set;
+ int ret, found = 0;
+ char *hashed = NULL, *sep;
+ struct list_head *pos;
+
+ if (list_empty(&(cap_list)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = parse_user_capability(ubuf, &set);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /*
+ * hash the string user1@user2@ngrp@grp... with randstr as the key
+ * XXX is there any vulnerability we're opening ourselves up to by
+ * not rebuilding the string from its components?
+ */
+ sep = strrchr(ubuf, '@');
+ if (sep) {
+ char *rand = sep + 1;
+ *sep = '\0';
+ hashed = cap_hash(ubuf, strlen(ubuf), rand, strlen(rand));
+ }
+ if (NULL == hashed) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Change the process's uid if the hash is present in the
+ * list of hashes
+ */
+ list_for_each(pos, &(cap_list)) {
+ node = list_entry(pos, struct cap_node, list);
+ if (current_user_ns() != node->user_ns)
+ continue;
+ if (0 == memcmp(hashed, node->data, CAP_NODE_SIZE)) {
+ ret = grant_id(&set);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Capability may only be used once */
+ del_cap_node(node);
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ printk(KERN_ALERT
+ "Invalid capabiliy written to /dev/capuse\n");
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ }
+out:
+ put_group_info(set.newgroups);
+ kfree(hashed);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t cap_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *f_pos)
+{
+ ssize_t retval = -ENOMEM;
+ char *user_buf;
+
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&cap_mutex))
+ return -EINTR;
+
+ user_buf = kzalloc(count+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!user_buf)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(user_buf, buf, count)) {
+ retval = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the minor number is 0 ( /dev/caphash ) then simply add the
+ * hashed capability supplied by the user to the list of hashes
+ */
+ if (cap_minor == iminor(filp->f_dentry->d_inode))
+ retval = add_caphash_entry(user_buf, count);
+ else
+ retval = use_caphash_entry(user_buf);
+
+ *f_pos += count;
+ retval = count;
+
+out:
+ kfree(user_buf);
+ mutex_unlock(&cap_mutex);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations cap_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .write = cap_write,
+ .open = cap_open,
+ .release = cap_release,
+};
+
+/* delete all hashed entries (at module exit) */
+static void cap_trim(void)
+{
+ struct cap_node *node, *tmp;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(node, tmp, &cap_list, list)
+ del_cap_node(node);
+}
+
+/* no __exit here because it can be called by the init function */
+static void cap_cleanup_module(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ dev_t devno = MKDEV(cap_major, cap_minor);
+ cap_trim();
+ if (cap_devices) {
+ for (i = 0; i < CAP_NR_DEVS; i++)
+ cdev_del(&cap_devices[i].cdev);
+ kfree(cap_devices);
+ }
+ unregister_chrdev_region(devno, CAP_NR_DEVS);
+
+}
+
+static void cap_setup_cdev(struct cap_dev *dev, int index)
+{
+ int err, devno = MKDEV(cap_major, cap_minor + index);
+ cdev_init(&dev->cdev, &cap_fops);
+ dev->cdev.owner = THIS_MODULE;
+ dev->cdev.ops = &cap_fops;
+ err = cdev_add(&dev->cdev, devno, 1);
+ if (err)
+ printk(KERN_NOTICE "Error %d adding cap%d", err, index);
+}
+
+static int __init cap_init_module(void)
+{
+ int result, i;
+ dev_t dev = 0;
+
+ if (cap_major) {
+ dev = MKDEV(cap_major, cap_minor);
+ result = register_chrdev_region(dev, CAP_NR_DEVS, "cap");
+ } else {
+ result = alloc_chrdev_region(&dev, cap_minor, CAP_NR_DEVS,
+ "cap");
+ cap_major = MAJOR(dev);
+ }
+
+ if (result < 0) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "cap: can't get major %d\n",
+ cap_major);
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ cap_devices = kzalloc(CAP_NR_DEVS * sizeof(struct cap_dev),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!cap_devices) {
+ result = -ENOMEM;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize each device. */
+ for (i = 0; i < CAP_NR_DEVS; i++)
+ cap_setup_cdev(&cap_devices[i], i);
+
+ return 0;
+
+fail:
+ cap_cleanup_module();
+ return result;
+}
+
+module_init(cap_init_module);
+module_exit(cap_cleanup_module);
+
+
--
1.7.0.4


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