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    SubjectRe: [PATCH 0/3] Taming execve, setuid, and LSMs
    On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 8:37 AM, Stephen Smalley <> wrote:
    > On Mon, 2010-04-19 at 16:39 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
    >> Quoting Andrew Lutomirski (

    >> > and LSM  transitions.  I
    >> > think this is a terrible idea for two reasons:
    >> >   1. LSM transitions already scare me enough, and if anyone relies on
    >> > them working in concert with setuid, then the mere act of separating
    >> > them might break things, even if the "privileged" (by LSM) app in
    >> > question is well-written.
    >> hmm...
    >> A good point.
    > At least in the case of SELinux, context transitions upon execve are
    > already disabled in the nosuid case, and Eric's patch updated the
    > SELinux test accordingly.

    True, but I think it's still asking for trouble -- other LSMs could
    (and almost certainly will, especially the out-of-tree ones) do
    something, and I think that any action at all that an LSM takes in the
    bprm_set_creds hook for a nosuid (or whatever it's called) process is
    wrong or at best misguided.

    Can you think of anything that an LSM should do (or even should be
    able to do) when a nosuid process calls exec, other than denying the
    request outright? With my patch, LSMs can still reject the open_exec

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