Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 8 Mar 2010 11:15:13 -0800 (PST) | From | Linus Torvalds <> | Subject | Re: Upstream first policy |
| |
On Mon, 8 Mar 2010, Linus Torvalds wrote: > > Sure, there is content security. Nobody disputes that. The security > decision about how to open a file is about the contents of the file.
Btw, I would also say that content security is generally the _common_ case. So I'm not at all saying that the traditional unix model or the selinux model is in any way "wrong". Not at all.
It's just that I certainly understand why some people think AppArmor is more "intuitive". And I think it's directly related to the fact that sometimes the pathname-based approach is the one that more directly reflects the particular issue (and people are often happy with the traditional UNIX semantics for plain inode-based security, so again, it's not like AppArmor _replaces_ inode-based security, it _extends_ on it).
Linus
| |