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    SubjectRe: Upstream first policy
    On Mon, Mar 08, 2010 at 06:45:21PM +0000, Al Viro wrote:
    > On Mon, Mar 08, 2010 at 10:08:31AM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
    > > In other words: it really _does_ make more sense to say "this process has
    > > rights to overwrite the path '/etc/passwd'" than it does to try to label
    > > the file. The _fundamental_ rule is about the pathname. The labeling comes
    > >
    > > I really don't understand why some people are unable to admit this fact.
    > Because you don't have to use that pathname to modify the bits returned
    > by read() after open() on that pathname?
    > I'm not fond of selinux, to put it mildly, but "pathname-based" stuff simply
    > doesn't match how the pathname resolution is defined on Unix...

    PS: at that point the *only* things I care about wrt "security" junk are
    * it shouldn't create new assertions to keep for VFS and fs code
    * it shouldn't break the normal Unix permissions for boxen that
    sanely have all that crap disabled
    * it shouldn't make one vomit just from RTFS
    * it shouldn't create obvious rootholes when enabled
    * it shouldn't add overhead from hell
    * it shouldn't try to hide the violations of the conditions above

    My opinion of the "security community" is worse than yours, BTW. You have
    decided that to let their stuff in; IMO it had been a mistake from the very
    beginning, but that's your tree.

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      Last update: 2010-03-08 19:57    [W:0.032 / U:39.592 seconds]
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