Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 8 Mar 2010 17:30:08 +0000 | From | Alan Cox <> | Subject | Re: Upstream first policy |
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> In that sense it appears to me that it's pretty much a universal truth that > 'pathnames' are a far more fitting abstraction to any 'human based security
Ingo - just about all the serious security work disagrees with you. Pathnames are references to objects and keep changing. What matters is the object itself. This is also how Unix has always worked
Imagine if chmod applied to the path not the inode ?
> Also, why was/(is?) AppArmor considered as a 'hostile competitor'
I don't believe it was. It was perceived as a technical failure, and then the file system people shredded the bits the security folks didn't.
There are certain things path name bases security works quite nicely for, primarily systems that have no concept of links. It's why it works ok-ish for httpd but for the general case nobody has ever really made it work properly.
Alan
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