lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2010]   [Dec]   [22]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: [PATCH v4] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers

* Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> wrote:

>
> > Hm, why is it off by default? Is there some user-space regression that is caused
> > by this?
> >
> > We really want good security measures to be active by default (and to work by
> > default) - they are not worth much if they are not.
>
> I agree entirely, but I've received a lot of resistance to these types
> of changes in net. I'm afraid that if it's enabled by default, no one
> will actually allow use of the %pK specifier where it should be used.

Some specific objections would be needed - which might arrive if the default is
changed to on.

> As far as I know, there's no actual breakage of anything in userspace,
> but there's a general "it might make it harder to debug things in
> certain limited circumstances" sentiment among some. I never understood
> why it is necessary for unprivileged users to be able to debug the
> kernel.
>
> Does anyone else have thoughts on this?

Well, lets just enable it by default and let others argue for less security, hm?

Thanks,

Ingo


\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2010-12-22 17:23    [W:0.061 / U:1.584 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site