Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 22 Dec 2010 17:20:25 +0100 | From | Ingo Molnar <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v4] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers |
| |
* Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> wrote:
> > > Hm, why is it off by default? Is there some user-space regression that is caused > > by this? > > > > We really want good security measures to be active by default (and to work by > > default) - they are not worth much if they are not. > > I agree entirely, but I've received a lot of resistance to these types > of changes in net. I'm afraid that if it's enabled by default, no one > will actually allow use of the %pK specifier where it should be used.
Some specific objections would be needed - which might arrive if the default is changed to on.
> As far as I know, there's no actual breakage of anything in userspace, > but there's a general "it might make it harder to debug things in > certain limited circumstances" sentiment among some. I never understood > why it is necessary for unprivileged users to be able to debug the > kernel. > > Does anyone else have thoughts on this?
Well, lets just enable it by default and let others argue for less security, hm?
Thanks,
Ingo
| |