Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 9 Nov 2010 13:39:18 +0800 | Subject | Re: [Security] [PATCH] Restrict unprivileged access to kernel syslog | From | Eugene Teo <> |
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On Tue, Nov 9, 2010 at 1:34 PM, Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> wrote: > On Mon, Nov 08, 2010 at 10:28:58PM -0500, Dan Rosenberg wrote: >> The kernel syslog contains debugging information that is often useful >> during exploitation of other vulnerabilities, such as kernel heap >> addresses. Rather than futilely attempt to sanitize hundreds (or >> thousands) of printk statements and simultaneously cripple useful >> debugging functionality, it is far simpler to create an option that >> prevents unprivileged users from reading the syslog. >> >> This patch, loosely based on grsecurity's GRKERNSEC_DMESG, creates the >> dmesg_restrict sysctl. When set to "0", the default, no restrictions >> are enforced. When set to "1", only users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can read >> the kernel syslog via dmesg(8) or other mechanisms. >> >> Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> > > Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> > > This looks good to me -- it leaves the /proc file access alone for > priv-dropping ksyslogd implementations.
Acked-by: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Looks good to me too. Thanks.
Eugene -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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