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SubjectRe: [PATCH] kernel: make /proc/kallsyms mode 400 to reduce ease of attacking
On 11/04/2010 10:38 AM, Tejun Heo wrote:
> Hello,
> On 11/04/2010 03:33 PM, Marcus Meissner wrote:
>> I mean the kernel could hide it from uname, but lsb_release,
>> /etc/redhat-release, /etc/SuSE-release etc still exist and then you
>> can still use the fixed address list table inside your exploit. But an
>> exploits needs to have such a list, making it harder to write.
> I do believe that making things more difficult to exploit helps. Many
> people seem to think it only gives false sense of security tho.
>> I also briefly thought about kernel ASLR, but my knowledge of the kernel
>> loading is too limited whether this is even possible or at all useful.
> We already have relocatable kernel for kdump and IIRC it doesn't add
> runtime overhead, so putting the kernel at random address shouldn't be
> too difficult. Not sure how useful that would be tho.

It's very coarse-grained relocation, which is why it works.


P.S. It's not just for kdump anymore.

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