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SubjectRe: [Security] proactive defense: using read-only memory
Hi!

> - Modules need to be correctly marked RO/NX. This patch exists[3], but is
> not in mainline. It needs to be in mainline.

Why not.

> - Pointers to function table also need to be marked read-only after
> they are set. An example of this is the security_ops table pointer. It
> gets set once at boot, and never changes again. These need to be handled
> so it isn't possible to just trivially reaim the entire security_ops
> table lookup somewhere else.

But there are too many of those. You can't block them all...

> - Entry points to set_kernel_text_rw() and similar need to be blockable.
> Having these symbols available make kernel memory modification trivial;

What prevents attacker to just inlining those functions in the
exploit?

If you want protection domain inside kernel, perhaps you should take
ukernel approach?

--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html


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