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    SubjectRe: [PATCH 2/3] Security: Implement disablenetwork semantics. (v4)
    > Quoting Pavel Machek (pavel@ucw.cz):
    > > > Quoting Michael Stone (michael@laptop.org):
    > > > > Serge Hallyn wrote:
    > > > > >Michael, I'm sorry, I should go back and search the thread for the
    > > > > >answer, but don't have time right now - do you really need
    > > > > >disablenetwork to be available to unprivileged users?
    > > > >
    > > > > Rainbow can only drop the networking privileges when we know at app launch time
    > > > > (e.g. based on a manifest or from the human operator) that privileges can be
    > > > > dropped. Unfortunately, most of the really interesting uses of disablenetwork
    > > > > happen *after* rainbow has dropped privilege and handed control the app.
    > > > > Therefore, having an API which can be used by at least some low-privilege
    > > > > processes is important to me.
    > > > >
    > > > > >is it ok to require CAP_SETPCAP (same thing required for dropping privs from
    > > > > >bounding set)?
    > > > >
    > > > > Let me try to restate your idea:
    > > > >
    > > > > We can make disablenetwork safer by permitting its use only where explicitly
    > > > > permitted by some previously privileged ancestor. The securebits facility
    > > > > described in
    > > > >
    > > > > http://lwn.net/Articles/280279/
    > > > >
    > > > > may be a good framework in which to implement this control.
    > > > >
    > > > > Did I understand correctly? If so, then yes, this approach seems like it would
    > > > > work for me.
    > > >
    > > > That is a little more than I was saying this time though I think I
    > > > suggested it earlier.
    > > >
    > > > But really I don't think anyone would care to separate a system into
    > > > some processes allowed to do unprivileged disablenetwork and other
    > > > processes not allowed to, so a (root-owned mode 644) sysctl seems just
    > > > as useful.
    > >
    > > Global solution like that is always wrong. (And we have better
    > > solution available.)
    >
    > All right, so Michael suggested securebits, I personally feel prctl would
    > be more appropriate.

    I'm happy with either approach so I'll prepare patches based on Serge's
    suggestion first.

    Regards,

    Michael


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