Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 12 Jan 2010 09:52:46 -0600 | From | "Serge E. Hallyn" <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 2/3] Security: Implement disablenetwork semantics. (v4) |
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Quoting Michael Stone (michael@laptop.org): > Serge Hallyn wrote: > >Michael, I'm sorry, I should go back and search the thread for the > >answer, but don't have time right now - do you really need > >disablenetwork to be available to unprivileged users? > > Rainbow can only drop the networking privileges when we know at app launch time > (e.g. based on a manifest or from the human operator) that privileges can be > dropped. Unfortunately, most of the really interesting uses of disablenetwork > happen *after* rainbow has dropped privilege and handed control the app. > Therefore, having an API which can be used by at least some low-privilege > processes is important to me. > > >is it ok to require CAP_SETPCAP (same thing required for dropping privs from > >bounding set)? > > Let me try to restate your idea: > > We can make disablenetwork safer by permitting its use only where explicitly > permitted by some previously privileged ancestor. The securebits facility > described in > > http://lwn.net/Articles/280279/ > > may be a good framework in which to implement this control. > > Did I understand correctly? If so, then yes, this approach seems like it would > work for me.
That is a little more than I was saying this time though I think I suggested it earlier.
But really I don't think anyone would care to separate a system into some processes allowed to do unprivileged disablenetwork and other processes not allowed to, so a (root-owned mode 644) sysctl seems just as useful.
> Regards, and thanks very much for your help, > > Michael > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
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