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SubjectRe: [PATCH 2/3] Security: Implement disablenetwork semantics. (v4)
Quoting Michael Stone (
> Serge Hallyn wrote:
> >Michael, I'm sorry, I should go back and search the thread for the
> >answer, but don't have time right now - do you really need
> >disablenetwork to be available to unprivileged users?
> Rainbow can only drop the networking privileges when we know at app launch time
> (e.g. based on a manifest or from the human operator) that privileges can be
> dropped. Unfortunately, most of the really interesting uses of disablenetwork
> happen *after* rainbow has dropped privilege and handed control the app.
> Therefore, having an API which can be used by at least some low-privilege
> processes is important to me.
> >is it ok to require CAP_SETPCAP (same thing required for dropping privs from
> >bounding set)?
> Let me try to restate your idea:
> We can make disablenetwork safer by permitting its use only where explicitly
> permitted by some previously privileged ancestor. The securebits facility
> described in
> may be a good framework in which to implement this control.
> Did I understand correctly? If so, then yes, this approach seems like it would
> work for me.

That is a little more than I was saying this time though I think I
suggested it earlier.

But really I don't think anyone would care to separate a system into
some processes allowed to do unprivileged disablenetwork and other
processes not allowed to, so a (root-owned mode 644) sysctl seems just
as useful.

> Regards, and thanks very much for your help,
> Michael
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