Messages in this thread |  | | | From | David Howells <> | | Subject | Re: [PATCH 1/1] exec: do not sleep in TASK_TRACED under ->cred_guard_mutex | | Date | Fri, 04 Sep 2009 09:39:07 +0100 |
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Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
> But I strongly believe we should blame another patch > > "CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials" > a6f76f23d297f70e2a6b3ec607f7aeeea9e37e8d > > The tracee must not sleep in TASK_TRACED holding this mutex (it was named > cred_exec_mutex). Even if we remove ->cred_guard_mutex from mm_for_maps() > and proc_pid_attr_write(), another task doing PTRACE_ATTACH should not > hang until it is killed or the tracee resumes.
Ummm... I don't see how this is relevant.
Yes, a task must not sleep in TASK_TRACED if it is holding this mutex, but how does that apply to do_exec(), mm_for_maps() or proc_pid_attr_write()? A process can't be in any of those three if it is in the TASK_TRACED state.
A process can only be in the TASK_TRACED state in one of two ways: its parent moved it there from the TASK_STOPPED state, or it put itself in that state - neither of which should apply here.
Apart from that, I've no objection to dropping the guard semaphore earlier.
I do think though, the problem is elsewhere. Are we failing to unlock the semaphore somewhere? Or double locking it, I wonder? Has Tom tried lockdep?
Btw, should mm_for_maps() use mutex_lock_interruptible()? There doesn't seem any point making it non-interruptible (except for kill signals) - unless that would muck up seqfile handling.
> +int prepare_bprm_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > +{
__acquires()
> +void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > +{
__releases()
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