Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | Date | Tue, 28 Jul 2009 15:58:57 -0700 | From | Greg KH <> | Subject | [patch 29/37] eCryptfs: parse_tag_3_packet check tag 3 packet encrypted key size (CVE-2009-2407) |
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2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
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From: Ramon de Carvalho Valle <ramon@risesecurity.org>
commit f151cd2c54ddc7714e2f740681350476cda03a28 upstream.
The parse_tag_3_packet function does not check if the tag 3 packet contains a encrypted key size larger than ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES.
Signed-off-by: Ramon de Carvalho Valle <ramon@risesecurity.org> [tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com: Added printk newline and changed goto to out_free] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
--- fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c @@ -730,6 +730,13 @@ parse_tag_3_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt } (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key_size = (body_size - (ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE + 5)); + if ((*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key_size + > ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "Tag 3 packet contains key larger " + "than ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES\n"); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out_free; + } if (unlikely(data[(*packet_size)++] != 0x04)) { printk(KERN_WARNING "Unknown version number [%d]\n", data[(*packet_size) - 1]);
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