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SubjectRe: integrity: nfsd imbalance bug fix
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On Fri, 2009-05-08 at 14:07 -0400, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> On Fri, May 08, 2009 at 01:35:20PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Wed, 2009-04-29 at 14:18 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > > On Tue, 28 Apr 2009 14:32:14 -0400
> > > Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > The number of calls to ima_path_check()/ima_file_free()
> > > > should be balanced. An extra call to fput(), indicates
> > > > the file could have been accessed without first being
> > > > measured.
> > > >
> > > > An nfsd exported file is opened/closed by the kernel
> > > > causing an integrity imbalance message.
> > > >
> > > > - rename and export opencount_get to ima_opencount_get
> > > > - replace ima_shm_check calls with ima_opencount_get
> > > > - add call to increment opencount for files opened by nfsd.
> > > > - add call to measure exported files in nfsd_permission().
> > > > - export ima_path_check
> > > >
> > >
> > > The patch looks fragile to me. It sprinkles IMA-specific operations
> > > over random unrelated subsystems. There is hence a decent chance of
> > > breakage in the future.
> > >
> > > Suppose some other new piece of kernel code opens/closes a file. The
> > > developer didn't think to add the IMA hooks and whoops, we have a bug.
> >
> > Agreed. Exactly for that reason we have the imbalance message. The
> > imbalance message is not a bug per se, but an indication that the
> > file hasn't been integrity (permission) checked.
>
> Where do I need to go to find out what this integrity checking is? I
> don't know the first thing about it....
>
> --b.

I'd start with the patch descriptions http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/2/4/251
and security/integrity/ima/Kconfig, which has a pointer to the initial
paper on IMA. Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy contains information
on defining a config file.

Mimi

> >
> > > It would be really really better if we could add the IMA hooks in a
> > > single place. That might require the addition of a new function, and
> > > that's fine. d_instantiate_kernel() or init_file_kernel() or whatever
> > > - that's fine. It still has the risk that new code will forget to use
> > > the in-kernel variant, but we have a better chance of detecting it.
> >
> > Definitely. Originally the integrity checking was in inode_permission().
> > But measuring a file requires a dentry and mount point.
> >
> > I've updated the patch to fix a 'counts' error and divided the patch
> > into two, separating the IMA code changes from the IMA calls in nfsd.
> >
> > > >
> > > > Index: security-testing-2.6/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> > > > ===================================================================
> > > > --- security-testing-2.6.orig/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> > > > +++ security-testing-2.6/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> > > > @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
> > > > #include <linux/security.h>
> > > > #endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4 */
> > > > #include <linux/jhash.h>
> > > > +#include <linux/ima.h>
> > > >
> > > > #include <asm/uaccess.h>
> > > >
> > > > @@ -735,6 +736,8 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct
> > > > flags, cred);
> > > > if (IS_ERR(*filp))
> > > > host_err = PTR_ERR(*filp);
> > > > + else
> > > > + ima_opencount_get(*filp);
> > >
> > > This suggests dentry_open_kernel().
> >
> > Good name, but making dentry_open_kernel() the default behavior,
> > would mask the real bug - not doing integrity (permission) checking.
> >
> > >
> > > > out_nfserr:
> > > > err = nfserrno(host_err);
> > > > out:
> > > > @@ -2096,7 +2099,13 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> > > > if (err == -EACCES && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
> > > > acc == (NFSD_MAY_READ | NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE))
> > > > err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
> > > > + if (err)
> > > > + goto nfsd_out;
> > > >
> > > > + err = ima_path_check(&exp->ex_path,
> > > > + acc & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
> > >
> > > hm, dunno what to do about that.
> >
> > The real problem is that this belongs in inode_permission(), but an
> > inode is not enough. It requires a dentry and mount point to
> > measure the file.
> >
> > > > + return err;
> > > > +nfsd_out:
> > > > return err? nfserrno(err) : 0;
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > Index: security-testing-2.6/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > > > ===================================================================
> > > > --- security-testing-2.6.orig/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > > > +++ security-testing-2.6/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > > > @@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ out:
> > > > kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
> > > > return 0;
> > > > }
> > > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_path_check);
> > > >
> > > > static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
> > > > int mask, int function)
> > > > @@ -234,7 +235,16 @@ out:
> > > > return rc;
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > -static void opencount_get(struct file *file)
> > > > +/*
> > > > + * ima_opencount_get - incr opencount for files opened by the kernel
> > > > + *
> > > > + * - IPC shm and shmat create/fput a file.
> > > > + * - nfsd opens/closes exported files.
> > > > + *
> > > > + * Increment the opencount for these files to prevent unnecessary
> > > > + * imbalance messages.
> > > > + */
> > > > +void ima_opencount_get(struct file *file)
> > > > {
> > > > struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
> > > > struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
> > > > @@ -248,6 +258,7 @@ static void opencount_get(struct file *f
> > > > iint->opencount++;
> > > > mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
> > > > }
> > > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_opencount_get);
> > > >
> > > > /**
> > > > * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
> > > > @@ -272,18 +283,6 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, uns
> > > > return 0;
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > -/*
> > > > - * ima_shm_check - IPC shm and shmat create/fput a file
> > > > - *
> > > > - * Maintain the opencount for these files to prevent unnecessary
> > > > - * imbalance messages.
> > > > - */
> > > > -void ima_shm_check(struct file *file)
> > > > -{
> > > > - opencount_get(file);
> > > > - return;
> > > > -}
> > > > -
> > > > /**
> > > > * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
> > > > * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
> > > > Index: security-testing-2.6/include/linux/ima.h
> > > > ===================================================================
> > > > --- security-testing-2.6.orig/include/linux/ima.h
> > > > +++ security-testing-2.6/include/linux/ima.h
> > > > @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ extern void ima_inode_free(struct inode
> > > > extern int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask);
> > > > extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
> > > > extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
> > > > -extern void ima_shm_check(struct file *file);
> > > > +extern void ima_opencount_get(struct file *file);
> > > >
> > > > #else
> > > > static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> > > > @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct f
> > > > return 0;
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > -static inline void ima_shm_check(struct file *file)
> > > > +static inline void ima_opencount_get(struct file *file)
> > > > {
> > > > return;
> > > > }
> > > > Index: security-testing-2.6/ipc/shm.c
> > > > ===================================================================
> > > > --- security-testing-2.6.orig/ipc/shm.c
> > > > +++ security-testing-2.6/ipc/shm.c
> > > > @@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static int newseg(struct ipc_namespace *
> > > > error = PTR_ERR(file);
> > > > if (IS_ERR(file))
> > > > goto no_file;
> > > > - ima_shm_check(file);
> > > > + ima_opencount_get(file);
> > > >
> > > > id = ipc_addid(&shm_ids(ns), &shp->shm_perm, ns->shm_ctlmni);
> > > > if (id < 0) {
> > > > @@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *sh
> > > > file = alloc_file(path.mnt, path.dentry, f_mode, &shm_file_operations);
> > > > if (!file)
> > > > goto out_free;
> > > > - ima_shm_check(file);
> > > > + ima_opencount_get(file);
> > > >
> > > > file->private_data = sfd;
> > > > file->f_mapping = shp->shm_file->f_mapping;
> > > > Index: security-testing-2.6/mm/shmem.c
> > > > ===================================================================
> > > > --- security-testing-2.6.orig/mm/shmem.c
> > > > +++ security-testing-2.6/mm/shmem.c
> > > > @@ -2680,7 +2680,7 @@ int shmem_zero_setup(struct vm_area_stru
> > > > if (IS_ERR(file))
> > > > return PTR_ERR(file);
> > > >
> > > > - ima_shm_check(file);
> > > > + ima_opencount_get(file);
> > > > if (vma->vm_file)
> > > > fput(vma->vm_file);
> > > > vma->vm_file = file;
> > >
> > > Maybe do the IMA operations in (or under) shmem_file_setup() and
> > > hugetlb_file_setup()?
> >
> > Again, that would hide the real issue of not having done integrity
> > (permission) checking.
> >
> > Mimi
> >



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