Messages in this thread |  | | | Date | Wed, 6 May 2009 23:54:50 +0200 | | From | Ingo Molnar <> | | Subject | Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86-64: seccomp: fix 32/64 syscall hole |
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* Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤) <markus@google.com> wrote:
> On Wed, May 6, 2009 at 14:29, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> wrote: > > That's a pretty interesting usage. What would be fallback mode you > > are using if the kernel doesnt have seccomp built in? Completely > > non-sandboxed? Or a ptrace/PTRACE_SYSCALL based sandbox? > > Ptrace has performance and/or reliability problems when used to > sandbox threaded applications due to potential race conditions > when inspecting system call arguments. We hope that we can avoid > this problem with seccomp. It is very attractive that kernel > automatically terminates any application that violates the very > well-defined constraints of the sandbox. > > In general, we are currently exploring different options based on > general availability, functionality, and complexity of > implementation. Seccomp is a good middle ground that we expect to > be able to use in the medium term to provide an acceptable > solution for a large segment of Linux users. Although the > restriction to just four unfiltered system calls is painful.
Which other system calls would you like to use? Futexes might be one, for fast synchronization primitives?
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