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SubjectRe: RFC: disablenetwork facility. (v4)
Benny Amorsen <benny+usenet@amorsen.dk> writes:

> Bryan Donlan <bdonlan@gmail.com> writes:
>
>> I, for one, think it would be best to handle it exactly like the
>> nosuid mount option - that is, pretend the file doesn't have any
>> setuid bits set. There's no reason to deny execution; if the process
>> would otherwise be able to execute it, it can also copy the file to
>> make a non-suid version and execute that instead.
>
> Execute != read. The executable file may contain secrets which must not
> be available to the user running the setuid program. If you fail the
> setuid, the user will be able to ptrace() and then the secret is
> revealed.
>
> It's amazing how many security holes appear from what seems like a very
> simple request.

Do we have a security hole in nosuid mount option?
Can someone write a patch to fix it?

Eric


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