Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sat, 31 Oct 2009 02:30:10 +0000 | From | Jamie Lokier <> | Subject | Re: symlinks with permissions |
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Eric W. Biederman wrote: > Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> writes: > >> How many linux shell scripts and other applications that use /dev/fd/N > >> or /proc/self/fd/N will you be breaking? > > > > Zero. (Well unless someone is exploiting it in wild). > > There are other differences like different offsets etc that may matter. > > >> Closing a theoretical security hole at the expense of breaking real > >> applications is a show stopper. > > > > I don't plan to remove /proc/*/fd; but I would like it to behave like > > dup(). > > > > (I still hope some security team does work for me :-).
Yes, it must not be like dup(), sharing the file pointer, because I'm sure that really will break some programs.
Like all the ones using gnulib (formerly libiberty) which use /proc/self/fd/N/path/to/file to implement fake openat(N,"path/to/file").
> I bet you will get a lot more traction and discussion if you write > a basic mostly working version of the patch.
I agree, and I'll be happy to review/break it ;-)
-- Jamie
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