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SubjectRe: symlinks with permissions
Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> writes:
> >> How many linux shell scripts and other applications that use /dev/fd/N
> >> or /proc/self/fd/N will you be breaking?
> >
> > Zero. (Well unless someone is exploiting it in wild).
>
> There are other differences like different offsets etc that may matter.
>
> >> Closing a theoretical security hole at the expense of breaking real
> >> applications is a show stopper.
> >
> > I don't plan to remove /proc/*/fd; but I would like it to behave like
> > dup().
> >
> > (I still hope some security team does work for me :-).

Yes, it must not be like dup(), sharing the file pointer, because I'm
sure that really will break some programs.

Like all the ones using gnulib (formerly libiberty) which use
/proc/self/fd/N/path/to/file to implement fake openat(N,"path/to/file").

> I bet you will get a lot more traction and discussion if you write
> a basic mostly working version of the patch.

I agree, and I'll be happy to review/break it ;-)

-- Jamie


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