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SubjectRe: symlinks with permissions

> >> It looks to me like it has been this way for better than a decade
> >> without problems so there is no point in changing it now.
> >
> > Unix compatibility?
> Thinking about this proc fundamentally gives you the ability to create
> (via open) a new file descriptor for a file you already have open.

Yes. Problem is that by using /proc, I can work-around open(READONLY)
restriction and work-around open(APPEND_ONLY) restriction.

> I do see a security issue in your example, but the security issue I
> see is how you have chosen to use the linux facilities, that have been
> there for ages. Facilities cloned from plan 9 and apparently
> available in slightly different forms on many unix variants existence.
> /dev/fd/N is not a linuxism.
> To close this whole would require some sort of stacking inode that
> when opened opened the real fs inode. With all kinds of convolutions
> and complications. Just to close the issue that some idiot might
> give someone a fd to a world writeable file that they don't want
> them to open.

Ok, so you agree issue is there. Good.

Now, fix for READONLY issue should be fairly simple: follow link in
/proc/*/fd/* should check the link permissions, and return
read-only/write-only descriptors as neccessary.

Basically, that follow link should behave as dup(), not as open().

> I certainly am not interested in debugging or maintaining the stacking
> inode code that would be necessary to close this theoretical corner
> case. There are much more real bugs that need attention.

But if we can get trivial 10-liner, that should be acceptable, right?

(cesky, pictures)

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