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SubjectRe: buffer overflow in /proc/sys/sunrpc/transports
On Sat, Aug 30, 2008 at 9:06 PM, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> wrote:
> [Vegard Nossum - Sat, Aug 30, 2008 at 08:44:22PM +0200]
> | Hi,
> |
> | I noticed that something weird is going on with /proc/sys/sunrpc/transports.
> | This file is generated in net/sunrpc/sysctl.c, function proc_do_xprt(). When
> | I "cat" this file, I get the expected output:
> |
> | $ cat /proc/sys/sunrpc/transports
> | tcp 1048576
> | udp 32768
> |
> | But I think that it does not check the length of the buffer supplied by
> | userspace to read(). With my original program, I found that the stack was
> | being overwritten by the characters above, even when the length given to
> | read() was just 1. So I have created a test program, see it at the bottom of
> | this e-mail. Here is its output:
> |
> ...
>
> Indeed, maybe just add checking for user buffer length?
> As proc_dodebug() in this file are doing. I don't think
> the user would be happy with his stack burned :)
>
> Something like:
> ---
>
> Index: linux-2.6.git/net/sunrpc/sysctl.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux-2.6.git.orig/net/sunrpc/sysctl.c 2008-07-20 11:40:14.000000000 +0400
> +++ linux-2.6.git/net/sunrpc/sysctl.c 2008-08-30 23:05:30.000000000 +0400
> @@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ static int proc_do_xprt(ctl_table *table
> return -EINVAL;
> else {
> len = svc_print_xprts(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf));
> + if (*lenp < len)
> + return -EFAULT;
> if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buffer, len))
> return -EFAULT;
>

Hm. I think this is wrong. Shouldn't we copy as many bytes as the user
indicated?


Vegard

--
"The animistic metaphor of the bug that maliciously sneaked in while
the programmer was not looking is intellectually dishonest as it
disguises that the error is the programmer's own creation."
-- E. W. Dijkstra, EWD1036


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