Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 13 Aug 2008 10:45:48 -0400 | From | Christoph Hellwig <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 1/4] integrity: TPM internel kernel interface |
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On Wed, Aug 13, 2008 at 02:40:40PM +0100, Alan Cox wrote: > > "goodies", the TCG technology does not protect against hardware > > attacks such as replacing the TPM with a bogus device, replacing the > > CRTM hardware, flashing the CRTM using a JTAG cable, lifting a TPM pin> > > and asserting reset, using a JTAG cable to set breakpoints and alter > > memory, etc. > > > > For this use case, the attack model is a remote, software attack. The> > > user is not considered the attacker. > > Surely if I can replace your TPM with alternative hardware then I can > also replace it with virtualised software traps.
Yes, which in fact is what most people working on TPM support use because the real hardware is just too slow :)
> [If there is a good document on this btw please just point me there > instead and I'll go read further]
I recommend this one: http://www.few.vu.nl/~srijith/publications/confs/sws07-final.pdf :)
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