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SubjectRe: [PATCH 1/4] integrity: TPM internel kernel interface
On Wed, Aug 13, 2008 at 02:40:40PM +0100, Alan Cox wrote:
> > "goodies", the TCG technology does not protect against hardware
> > attacks such as replacing the TPM with a bogus device, replacing the
> > CRTM hardware, flashing the CRTM using a JTAG cable, lifting a TPM pin>
> > and asserting reset, using a JTAG cable to set breakpoints and alter
> > memory, etc.
> >
> > For this use case, the attack model is a remote, software attack. The>
> > user is not considered the attacker.
>
> Surely if I can replace your TPM with alternative hardware then I can
> also replace it with virtualised software traps.

Yes, which in fact is what most people working on TPM support use
because the real hardware is just too slow :)

> [If there is a good document on this btw please just point me there
> instead and I'll go read further]

I recommend this one:
http://www.few.vu.nl/~srijith/publications/confs/sws07-final.pdf :)



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