Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [RFC] Tracepoint proposal | From | (Frank Ch. Eigler) | Date | Tue, 24 Jun 2008 07:55:25 -0400 |
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"Takashi Nishiie" <t-nishiie@np.css.fujitsu.com> writes:
> [...] > Each kernel sub-system seems to have its own way of dealing with > debugging statements. Some of these methods include 'dprintk', > 'pr_debug', 'dev_debug', 'DEBUGP'. I think that these functions are > the tracepoints that has been availably mounted without setting up > the tool set of the outside. I think whether mounting that unites > these functions can be done if kernel marker and tracepoint are used.
There are efforts underway to collect these various debug methods into a single run-time-dynamic stream, which may even turn out to connect to markers.
> By the way, isn't there problem on security? What kprobe, jprobe, > and kernel marker, etc. offer looks like what the framework of Linux > Security Module had offered before. Gotten kprobe, jprobe, and > kernel marker, etc. should not be exported to the userland for > security because it becomes the hotbed of rootkits.
These are all kernel-side facilities with no direct connection to user-land.
> Users such as kprobe, jprobe, and kernel marker should not be > Loadable Kernel Module. [...]
That would defeat their usefulness. Remember, kernel modules run with no hardware-level restrictions at all, so if an adversary managed to load up some kernel malware module, the game is over, whether or not they use kprobes.
- FChE
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