Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 28 May 2008 13:14:00 -0700 | From | Chris Wright <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH] sysctl: permission check based on capability not euid |
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* Stephen Hemminger (stephen.hemminger@vyatta.com) wrote: > This patch modifies the permission checks for sysctl's from being based on uid=0 (root) > to use the capability system. This matches the behavior of other OS's using sysctl's > and capabilities. Linux has tried to get away from using uid=0 for security overrides > and use capabilities instead. > > I was working on Quagga enhancement that involved enabling a sysctl, and it didn't > work because is a safe daemon and drops privileges and resets its real/effective uid > after initialization; it then re-enables only the capabilities when it needs to > do some privileged operation. This wouldn't work because sysctl's were still using > the root based permission check. The existing code in quagga to enable ip forwarding > doesn't work for the same reason.
I don't think CAP_SYS_ADMIN makes sense for net.*, for example.
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