Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sat, 8 Mar 2008 19:15:18 -0800 | From | Greg KH <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 5/9] Make use of permissions, returned by kobj_lookup |
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On Sat, Mar 08, 2008 at 03:47:57PM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Greg KH (greg@kroah.com): > > On Fri, Mar 07, 2008 at 12:50:52PM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > Quoting Greg KH (greg@kroah.com): > > > > On Fri, Mar 07, 2008 at 11:35:42AM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > > > > Do you really want to run other LSMs within a containerd kernel? Is > > > > > > that a requirement? It would seem to run counter to the main goal of > > > > > > containers to me. > > > > > > > > > > Until user namespaces are complete, selinux seems the only good solution > > > > > to offer isolation. > > > > > > > > Great, use that instead :) > > > > > > That can't work as is since you can't specify major:minor in policy. > > > > Your LSM can not, or the LSM interface does not allow this to happen? > > No my lsm in fact does, you just can't do it with selinux policy at the > moment. I was still responding to your "just use selinux" :)
I never said "use selinux", do you think I am crazy? :)
Just use your own lsm, that's all I recommended.
> > > So all we could do again is simply refuse all mknod, which we can > > > already do with per-process capability bounding sets. > > > > I thought we passed that info down to the LSM module, can't you do your > > selection at that point in time? > > > > And then, just mediate open() like always, right? > > Yup, the patch I included inline does that.
Great. But don't put that other file in the core kernel, put it in security/ please.
> An LSM can address the problem. It just felt like more of a > patch-over-the-real-problem kind of solution.
I disagree, it sounds exactly like what LSM is for.
thanks,
greg k-h
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