Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH 5/9] Make use of permissions, returned by kobj_lookup | From | Stephen Smalley <> | Date | Fri, 07 Mar 2008 14:46:12 -0500 |
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On Fri, 2008-03-07 at 12:30 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Casey Schaufler (casey@schaufler-ca.com): > > > > --- "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote: > > > > > ... > > > > > > Until user namespaces are complete, selinux seems the only good solution > > > to offer isolation. > > > > Smack does it better and cheaper. (Unless you define good==selinux) > > (insert smiley) > > Ah, thanks - I hadn't looked into it, but yes IIUC smack should > definately work. I'll have to give that a shot.
Not if you want to confine uid 0. smack doesn't control capabilities, even the ones used to override it.
So you'd have to at least configure your per-process bset and file caps rather carefully. And even then you have to watch out for things with CAP_MAC* or CAP_SETPCAP.
> (A basic selinux policy module to isolate a container was pretty simple, > but providing finer-grained intra-container access seems to take some > changes to the base refpolicy. I've been waiting a few weeks to find > time to work on that.)
-- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency
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