Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 12 Mar 2008 16:36:51 +0300 | From | Pavel Emelyanov <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 5/9] Make use of permissions, returned by kobj_lookup |
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Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Pavel Emelyanov (xemul@openvz.org): >> Greg KH wrote: >>> On Tue, Mar 11, 2008 at 12:57:55PM +0300, Pavel Emelyanov wrote: >>>> Besides, I've measured some things - the lat_syscall test for open from >>>> lmbench test suite and the nptl perf test. Here are the results: >>>> >>>> sec nosec >>>> open 3.0980s 3.0709s >>>> nptl 2.7746s 2.7710s >>>> >>>> So we have 0.88% loss in open and ~0.15% with nptl. I know, this is not that >>>> much, but it is noticeable. Besides, this is only two tests, digging deeper >>>> may reveal more. >>> I think that is in the noise of sampling if you run that test many more >>> times. >> These numbers are average values of 20 runs of each test. I didn't >> provide the measurement accuracy, but the abs(open.sec - open.nosec) >> is greater than it. >> >>>> Let alone the fact that simply turning the CONFIG_SECURITY to 'y' puts +8Kb >>>> to the vmlinux... >>>> >>>> I think, I finally agree with you and Al Viro, that the kobj mapper is >>>> not the right place to put the filtering, but taking the above numbers >>>> into account, can we put the "hooks" into the #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ >>>> versions of security_inode_permission/security_file_permission/etc? >>> Ask the security module interface maintainers about this, not me :) >> OK :) Thanks for your time, Greg. >> >> So, Serge, since you already have a LSM-based version, maybe you can >> change it with the proposed "fix" and send it to LSM maintainers for >> review? > > To take the point of view of someone who neither wants containers nor > LSM but just a fast box, > > you're asking me to introduce LSM hooks for the !SECURITY case? :)
No exactly. Look at security_ptrace, security_task_kill or security_vm_enough_memory for !SECURITY cases. I wanted to see similar for device access list not to replace selinux with this small "security module" and not to carry this huge LSM for our modest purposes.
> I can give it a shot, but I expect some complaints. Now at least the > _mknod hook shouldn't be a hotpath, and I suppose I can add yet > an #ifdef inside the !SECURITY version of security_inode_permission(). > I still expect some complaints though. I'll send something soon. > > thanks, > -serge > >>> good luck, >>> >>> greg k-h >>> >
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