Messages in this thread |  | | | Date | Sun, 17 Feb 2008 21:17:25 -0800 (PST) | | From | Casey Schaufler <> | | Subject | Re: Possible problem in linux file posix capabilities | |
--- "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote:> ....> > Two quick fixes for you right now (apart from the one you've already
> got :) would be> > 1. give wireshark cap_kill, by doing something like
>
> capset cap_kill=ep /bin/wireshark
>
> 2. compile a kernel with SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n
>
> Andrew, this pretty much was bound to happen... we need to figure out
> what our approach here should be. My preference is still to allow
> signals when p->uid==current->uid so long as !SECURE_NOROOT. Then as
> people start using secure_noroot process trees they at least must know
> what they're asking for.
>
> An alternative stance is to accept these things as they come up and try
> to quickly work with the authors of such programs to work around it. I
> suppose in a security sense that's the superior way :) But it also
> seems likely to lead to most people choosing option 2 above and not
> bothering to fix the problem.
I probably just missed it when it went by, but do you have some
test cases for file capabilities lying about that I might use?
Thank you.
Casey Schaufler
casey@schaufler-ca.com
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