Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: OOPS in request_key.c bisected (and then refound) | From | Pascal Terjan <> | Date | Tue, 28 Oct 2008 14:33:52 +0100 |
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This patch was confirmed by a user here to fix the oops (happened while using mount.cifs with kerberos). Is there a reason not to merge it (and into stable too) ?
Le dimanche 17 août 2008 à 20:18 -0500, Steve French a écrit : > Copying lkml on this additional feedback on the patch to fix the oops > introduced in April by the keyctl subsystem > > On Sun, Aug 17, 2008 at 2:45 PM, Rutger Nijlunsing > <rutger.nijlunsing@gmail.com> wrote: > > When trying to mount an CIFS share with SPGENO on Debian, I got > > nothing. Digging deeping revealing on OOPS at function > > call_sbin_request_key+0x166/0x255in 2.6.27 which was not there in > > 2.6.25. Bisecting this with the simplest command generating the OOPS, > > which was taken from 'man keyctl': > > > > keyctl request2 user debug:yyyy spoon > > > > took about 4 hours on the evolutionary dead-end Pentium 4 and returned > > commit: > > > > commit 69664cf16af4f31cd54d77948a4baf9c7e0ca7b9 > > Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> > > Date: Tue Apr 29 01:01:31 2008 -0700 > > > > keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed > > > > ...as the culprit. > > > > Googling for this revealed that this OOPS had been reported before in > > May, that a patch was written, tested and considered OK: > > http://lists.samba.org/archive/linux-cifs-client/2008-May/003001.html > > > > Applying this patch is still the right thing to do since it made the > > OOPS disappear. Hopefully this will solve my SPNEGO problems, but > > that's a second concern. Here is the patch again, together with > > additional Tested-bys: > > > > --- > > KEYS: Make request key instantiate the per-user keyrings > > > > Make request_key() instantiate the per-user keyrings so that it doesn't oops > > if it needs to get hold of the user session keyring because there isn't a > > session keyring in place. > > > > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> > > Tested-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> > > Tested-by: Rutger Nijlunsing <rutger.nijlunsing@gmail.com> > > --- > > > > security/keys/internal.h | 1 + > > security/keys/process_keys.c | 2 +- > > security/keys/request_key.c | 4 ++++ > > 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h > > index 8c05587..2bdfacc 100644 > > --- a/security/keys/internal.h > > +++ b/security/keys/internal.h > > @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, > > > > extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check); > > > > +extern int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk); > > extern int install_thread_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk); > > extern int install_process_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk); > > > > diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c > > index 5be6d01..45b240a 100644 > > --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c > > +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c > > @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct key_user root_key_user = { > > /* > > * install user and user session keyrings for a particular UID > > */ > > -static int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk) > > +int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk) > > { > > struct user_struct *user = tsk->user; > > struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring; > > diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c > > index ba32ca6..abea08f 100644 > > --- a/security/keys/request_key.c > > +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c > > @@ -74,6 +74,10 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, > > > > kenter("{%d},{%d},%s", key->serial, authkey->serial, op); > > > > + ret = install_user_keyrings(tsk); > > + if (ret < 0) > > + goto error_alloc; > > + > > /* allocate a new session keyring */ > > sprintf(desc, "_req.%u", key->serial); > > > > > > > > -- > > Rutger Nijlunsing ---------------------------------- eludias ed dse.nl > > never attribute to a conspiracy which can be explained by incompetence > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
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