Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 10 Oct 2008 10:41:49 +0200 | From | Daniel Lezcano <> | Subject | Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/2] first callers of process_deny_checkpoint() |
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Dave Hansen wrote: > These are just a few simple examples of things we know we can't > checkpoint now. There are plenty more, but this should give > everyone an idea how this will look in practice. > > > Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > --- > > linux-2.6.git-dave/fs/aio.c | 7 +++++++ > linux-2.6.git-dave/ipc/mqueue.c | 3 +++ > linux-2.6.git-dave/net/socket.c | 5 +++++ > 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+) > > diff -puN fs/aio.c~no-checkpointing-for-sockets fs/aio.c > --- linux-2.6.git/fs/aio.c~no-checkpointing-for-sockets 2008-10-09 11:56:58.000000000 -0700 > +++ linux-2.6.git-dave/fs/aio.c 2008-10-09 11:56:58.000000000 -0700 > @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ > > #define DEBUG 0 > > +#include <linux/checkpoint.h> > #include <linux/sched.h> > #include <linux/fs.h> > #include <linux/file.h> > @@ -1663,6 +1664,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_io_submit(aio_contex > if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(*iocbpp))))) > return -EFAULT; > > + process_deny_checkpointing(current); > + > ctx = lookup_ioctx(ctx_id); > if (unlikely(!ctx)) { > pr_debug("EINVAL: io_submit: invalid context id\n"); > @@ -1742,6 +1745,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_io_cancel(aio_contex > if (unlikely(!ctx)) > return -EINVAL; > > + process_deny_checkpointing(current); > + > spin_lock_irq(&ctx->ctx_lock); > ret = -EAGAIN; > kiocb = lookup_kiocb(ctx, iocb, key); > @@ -1796,6 +1801,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_io_getevents(aio_con > struct kioctx *ioctx = lookup_ioctx(ctx_id); > long ret = -EINVAL; > > + process_deny_checkpointing(current); > + > if (likely(ioctx)) { > if (likely(min_nr <= nr && min_nr >= 0 && nr >= 0)) > ret = read_events(ioctx, min_nr, nr, events, timeout); > diff -puN ipc/mqueue.c~no-checkpointing-for-sockets ipc/mqueue.c > --- linux-2.6.git/ipc/mqueue.c~no-checkpointing-for-sockets 2008-10-09 11:56:58.000000000 -0700 > +++ linux-2.6.git-dave/ipc/mqueue.c 2008-10-09 11:56:58.000000000 -0700 > @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ > */ > > #include <linux/capability.h> > +#include <linux/checkpoint.h> > #include <linux/init.h> > #include <linux/pagemap.h> > #include <linux/file.h> > @@ -655,6 +656,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mq_open(const char _ > char *name; > int fd, error; > > + process_deny_checkpointing(current); > + > error = audit_mq_open(oflag, mode, u_attr); > if (error != 0) > return error; > diff -puN net/socket.c~no-checkpointing-for-sockets net/socket.c > --- linux-2.6.git/net/socket.c~no-checkpointing-for-sockets 2008-10-09 11:56:58.000000000 -0700 > +++ linux-2.6.git-dave/net/socket.c 2008-10-09 11:56:58.000000000 -0700 > @@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ > #include <linux/audit.h> > #include <linux/wireless.h> > #include <linux/nsproxy.h> > +#include <linux/checkpoint.h> > > #include <asm/uaccess.h> > #include <asm/unistd.h> > @@ -1236,6 +1237,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_socket(int family, i > if (SOCK_NONBLOCK != O_NONBLOCK && (flags & SOCK_NONBLOCK)) > flags = (flags & ~SOCK_NONBLOCK) | O_NONBLOCK; > > + process_deny_checkpointing(current); > + > retval = sock_create(family, type, protocol, &sock); > if (retval < 0) > goto out; > @@ -2130,6 +2133,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_socketcall(int call, > a0 = a[0]; > a1 = a[1]; > > + process_deny_checkpointing(current); > + > switch (call) { > case SYS_SOCKET: > err = sys_socket(a0, a1, a[2]);
That seems to be a good idea.
There isn't a risk of a big propagation of this function all around the kernel code ? Especially if there are partial support for a specific resource ? I mean we are able to checkpoint ipv4/tcp sockets, (yeah I like socket examples :) ) , but not other protocols so we have to remove from sys_socket the process_deny_checkpoint and add it to all others protocols.
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