lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2007]   [Sep]   [3]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
Patch in this message
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: [PATCH] i386 and x86_64: randomize brk()
On Mon, 3 Sep 2007, Franck Bui-Huu wrote:

> > > +/* overriden by architectures supporting brk randomization */
> > > +void __weak arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm) { }
> I was actually suggesting in my last email:
> unsigned long randomize_brk(unsigned long brk)
> therefore arch specific code don't have to know about implementation
> details ie how to retrieve brk values from a mm. And it also matches
> the prototype of arch_align_stack().

OK, I personally don't care that much. Andrew, the version as per Franck's
suggestion is below. It should be functionally equivalent to the patch
sent in my previous message in this thread, please consider merging one of
them. Thanks a lot.


From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

i386 and x86_64: randomize brk()

This patch randomizes the location of the heap (brk) for i386 and x86_64.
The range is randomized in the range starting at current brk location up
to 0x02000000 offset for both architectures. This, together with
pie-executable-randomization.patch and
pie-executable-randomization-fix.patch, should make the address space
randomization on i386 and x86_64 complete.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/process.c b/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
index 8466471..8e0624d 100644
--- a/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
@@ -949,3 +949,17 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
sp -= get_random_int() % 8192;
return sp & ~0xf;
}
+
+unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(unsigned long brk)
+{
+ unsigned long new_brk;
+ unsigned long range_end;
+
+ range_end = brk + 0x02000000;
+ new_brk = randomize_range(brk, range_end, 0);
+ if (new_brk)
+ return new_brk;
+ else
+ return brk;
+}
+
diff --git a/arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c
index 2842f50..b20f0eb 100644
--- a/arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c
@@ -902,3 +902,17 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
sp -= get_random_int() % 8192;
return sp & ~0xf;
}
+
+unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(unsigned long brk)
+{
+ unsigned long new_brk;
+ unsigned long range_end;
+
+ range_end = brk + 0x02000000;
+ new_brk = randomize_range(brk, range_end, 0);
+ if (new_brk)
+ return new_brk;
+ else
+ return brk;
+}
+
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
index d65f1d9..7afec71 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct pt_regs *regs);
static int load_elf_library(struct file *);
static unsigned long elf_map (struct file *, unsigned long, struct elf_phdr *, int, int, unsigned long);

+/* overriden by architectures supporting brk randomization */
+unsigned long __weak arch_randomize_brk(unsigned long brk) { return brk; }
+
/*
* If we don't support core dumping, then supply a NULL so we
* don't even try.
@@ -1073,6 +1076,10 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct pt_regs *regs)
current->mm->end_data = end_data;
current->mm->start_stack = bprm->p;

+ if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
+ current->mm->brk = current->mm->start_brk =
+ arch_randomize_brk(current->mm->brk);
+
if (current->personality & MMAP_PAGE_ZERO) {
/* Why this, you ask??? Well SVr4 maps page 0 as read-only,
and some applications "depend" upon this behavior.
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2007-09-03 22:47    [from the cache]
©2003-2011 Jasper Spaans