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Subject[PATCH] selinux: Improving SELinux read/write performance
Hello.

I would like to propose patch that reduces overhead in read/write by SELinux.
I sent RFC in previous thread.
http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/9/6/14
As a result of discussion in previous thread,
quality of code has improved, so I would like to submit patch here.

1. Background
Look at benchmark result below.
lmbench simple read/write(average of 5 run).
Big overhead exists especially on SH(SuperH) arch.

1) Result for x86(Pentium 4 2.6Ghz), kernel 2.6.22
Base SELinux Overhead(%)
Simple read 1.10 1.24 12.3
Simple write 1.02 1.14 14.0
* Base: kernel compiled without SELinux support

2) Result for SH(SH4, SH7751R), kernel 2.6.22
Base SELinux Overhead(%)
Simple read 2.39 5.49 130.5
Simple write 2.07 5.10 146.6

2. About patch
It reduces the selinux overhead on read/write by only revalidating
permissions in selinux_file_permission if the task or inode labels have
changed or the policy has changed since the open-time check.
A new LSM hook, security_dentry_open, is added to capture
the necessary state at open time to allow this optimization.

3. Result of benchmark after applying patch
1) Result for x86(Pentium 4 2.6Ghz), kernel 2.6.22
Base SELinux Overhead(%)
Simple read 1.10 1.13 2.3(Before 12.3)
Simple write 1.02 1.024 0.6(Before 14.0)
* Base: kernel compiled without SELinux support

2) Result for SH(SH4, SH7751R), kernel 2.6.22
Base SELinux Overhead(%)
Simple read 2.39 2.63 10.4(Before 130.5)
Simple write 2.07 2.34 13.1(Before 146.6)

Overhead in read/write is reduced a lot.
This patch adds permission check at open time(in __dentry_open),
but open/close performance does not get worse as shown below.

* Lmbench simple open/close
Pentium 4(before patch):
Base SELinux Overhead(%)
open/close 5.97 7.45 24.9
after patch:
open/close 5.97 7.48 25.3

SH(before patch):
Base SELinux Overhead(%)
open/close 32.6 62.8 93.0
after patch:
open/close 32.6 58.7 80.2

Next is a patch for 2.6.22.

It reduces the selinux overhead on read/write by only revalidating
permissions in selinux_file_permission if the task or inode labels have
changed or the policy has changed since the open-time check. A new LSM
hook, security_dentry_open, is added to capture the necessary state at
open time to allow this optimization.

Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura<ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
---
fs/open.c | 4 ++
include/linux/security.h | 18 ++++++++++++
security/dummy.c | 6 ++++
security/selinux/avc.c | 5 +++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/include/avc.h | 2 +
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 2 +
7 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff -purN -X linux-2.6.22/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.22.orig/security/selinux/avc.c linux-2.6.22/security/selinux/avc.c
--- linux-2.6.22.orig/security/selinux/avc.c 2007-07-09 08:32:17.000000000 +0900
+++ linux-2.6.22/security/selinux/avc.c 2007-09-14 08:35:04.000000000 +0900
@@ -913,3 +913,8 @@ int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16
avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata);
return rc;
}
+
+u32 avc_policy_seqno(void)
+{
+ return avc_cache.latest_notif;
+}
diff -purN -X linux-2.6.22/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.22.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c linux-2.6.22/security/selinux/hooks.c
--- linux-2.6.22.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c 2007-07-09 08:32:17.000000000 +0900
+++ linux-2.6.22/security/selinux/hooks.c 2007-09-14 08:43:51.000000000 +0900
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
* <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
* Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
* Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
+ * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
@@ -2458,7 +2460,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(st

/* file security operations */

-static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
int rc;
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
@@ -2480,6 +2482,25 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struc
return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
}

+static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+
+ if (!mask) {
+ /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
+ && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
+ return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
+
+ return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
+}
+
static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
return file_alloc_security(file);
@@ -2715,6 +2736,34 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct f
return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
}

+static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ fsec = file->f_security;
+ isec = inode->i_security;
+ /*
+ * Save inode label and policy sequence number
+ * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
+ * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
+ * Task label is already saved in the file security
+ * struct as its SID.
+ */
+ fsec->isid = isec->sid;
+ fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
+ /*
+ * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
+ * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
+ * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
+ * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
+ * new inode label or new policy.
+ * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
+ */
+ return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
+}
+
/* task security operations */

static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
@@ -4780,6 +4829,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinu
.file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
.file_receive = selinux_file_receive,

+ .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
+
.task_create = selinux_task_create,
.task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
.task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
diff -purN -X linux-2.6.22/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.22.orig/security/selinux/include/avc.h linux-2.6.22/security/selinux/include/avc.h
--- linux-2.6.22.orig/security/selinux/include/avc.h 2007-07-09 08:32:17.000000000 +0900
+++ linux-2.6.22/security/selinux/include/avc.h 2007-09-14 08:35:04.000000000 +0900
@@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);

+u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
+
#define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT 1
#define AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE 2
#define AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE 4
diff -purN -X linux-2.6.22/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.22.orig/security/selinux/include/objsec.h linux-2.6.22/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
--- linux-2.6.22.orig/security/selinux/include/objsec.h 2007-07-09 08:32:17.000000000 +0900
+++ linux-2.6.22/security/selinux/include/objsec.h 2007-09-14 08:35:04.000000000 +0900
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ struct file_security_struct {
struct file *file; /* back pointer to file object */
u32 sid; /* SID of open file description */
u32 fown_sid; /* SID of file owner (for SIGIO) */
+ u32 isid; /* SID of inode at the time of file open */
+ u32 pseqno; /* Policy seqno at the time of file open */
};

struct superblock_security_struct {
diff -purN -X linux-2.6.22/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.22.orig/fs/open.c linux-2.6.22/fs/open.c
--- linux-2.6.22.orig/fs/open.c 2007-07-09 08:32:17.000000000 +0900
+++ linux-2.6.22/fs/open.c 2007-09-14 08:40:46.000000000 +0900
@@ -696,6 +696,10 @@ static struct file *__dentry_open(struct
f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop);
file_move(f, &inode->i_sb->s_files);

+ error = security_dentry_open(f);
+ if (error)
+ goto cleanup_all;
+
if (!open && f->f_op)
open = f->f_op->open;
if (open) {
diff -purN -X linux-2.6.22/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.22.orig/include/linux/security.h linux-2.6.22/include/linux/security.h
--- linux-2.6.22.orig/include/linux/security.h 2007-07-09 08:32:17.000000000 +0900
+++ linux-2.6.22/include/linux/security.h 2007-09-14 08:44:13.000000000 +0900
@@ -503,6 +503,13 @@ struct request_sock;
* @file contains the file structure being received.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*
+ * Security hook for dentry
+ *
+ * @dentry_open
+ * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon
+ * file_permission, and recheck access if anything has changed
+ * since inode_permission.
+ *
* Security hooks for task operations.
*
* @task_create:
@@ -1253,6 +1260,7 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*file_send_sigiotask) (struct task_struct * tsk,
struct fown_struct * fown, int sig);
int (*file_receive) (struct file * file);
+ int (*dentry_open) (struct file *file);

int (*task_create) (unsigned long clone_flags);
int (*task_alloc_security) (struct task_struct * p);
@@ -1854,6 +1862,11 @@ static inline int security_file_receive
return security_ops->file_receive (file);
}

+static inline int security_dentry_open (struct file *file)
+{
+ return security_ops->dentry_open (file);
+}
+
static inline int security_task_create (unsigned long clone_flags)
{
return security_ops->task_create (clone_flags);
@@ -2529,6 +2542,11 @@ static inline int security_file_receive
return 0;
}

+static inline int security_dentry_open (struct file *file)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_task_create (unsigned long clone_flags)
{
return 0;
--- linux-2.6.22.orig/security/dummy.c 2007-07-09 08:32:17.000000000 +0900
+++ linux-2.6.22/security/dummy.c 2007-09-14 08:35:04.000000000 +0900
@@ -459,6 +459,11 @@ static int dummy_file_receive (struct fi
return 0;
}

+static int dummy_dentry_open (struct file *file)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int dummy_task_create (unsigned long clone_flags)
{
return 0;
@@ -1029,6 +1034,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_set_fowner);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_send_sigiotask);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_receive);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, dentry_open);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_create);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_free_security);
Regards,
--
Yuichi Nakamura
Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
Japan SELinux Users Group(JSELUG): http://www.selinux.gr.jp/
SELinux Policy Editor: http://seedit.sourceforge.net/

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