Messages in this thread |  | | | Date | Fri, 20 Jul 2007 08:48:01 -0500 | | From | "Serge E. Hallyn" <> | | Subject | Re: [PATCH 1/8] eCryptfs: Add key list structure; search keyring |
| |
Quoting Michael Halcrow (mhalcrow@us.ibm.com): > Add support structures for handling multiple keys. The list in
Excellent.
Very glad to see this implemented. A few comments inline.
> crypt_stat contains the key identifiers for all of the keys that > should be used for encrypting each file's File Encryption Key > (FEK). For now, each inode inherits this list from the mount-wide > crypt_stat struct, via the > ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs() function. > > This patch also removes the global key tfm from the mount-wide > crypt_stat struct, instead keeping a list of tfm's meant for dealing > with the various inode FEK's. eCryptfs will now search the user's > keyring for FEK's parsed from the existing file metadata, so the user > can make keys available at any time before or after mounting. > > Now that multiple FEK packets can be written to the file metadata, we > need to be more meticulous about size limits. The updates to the code > for writing out packets to the file metadata makes sizes and limits > more explicit, uniformly expressed, and (hopefully) easier to follow. > > Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> > --- > fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c | 208 ++++++++++-- > fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h | 71 ++++- > fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 743 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- > fs/ecryptfs/main.c | 121 +++----- > 4 files changed, 742 insertions(+), 401 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c > index 6ac6306..4f7d895 100644 > --- a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c > +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c > @@ -204,6 +204,8 @@ void > ecryptfs_init_crypt_stat(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) > { > memset((void *)crypt_stat, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat)); > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&crypt_stat->keysig_list); > + mutex_init(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); > mutex_init(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex); > mutex_init(&crypt_stat->cs_tfm_mutex); > mutex_init(&crypt_stat->cs_hash_tfm_mutex); > @@ -218,20 +220,41 @@ ecryptfs_init_crypt_stat(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) > */ > void ecryptfs_destruct_crypt_stat(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) > { > + struct ecryptfs_key_sig *key_sig, *key_sig_tmp; > + > if (crypt_stat->tfm) > crypto_free_blkcipher(crypt_stat->tfm); > if (crypt_stat->hash_tfm) > crypto_free_hash(crypt_stat->hash_tfm); > + mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex);
Curious - at this point you know you have the last reference to the inode, right? And you're not decrementing a use count on the crypt_stats, you're just zeroing it out. So you must not think anyone else has references to it.
So why do you need to grab the mutex here?
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(key_sig, key_sig_tmp, > + &crypt_stat->keysig_list, crypt_stat_list) { > + list_del(&key_sig->crypt_stat_list); > + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_sig_cache, key_sig); > + } > + mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); > memset(crypt_stat, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat)); > } > > void ecryptfs_destruct_mount_crypt_stat( > struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat) > { > - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_key) > - key_put(mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_key); > - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm) > - crypto_free_blkcipher(mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm); > + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *auth_tok, *auth_tok_tmp; > + > + if (!(mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_MOUNT_CRYPT_STAT_INITIALIZED)) > + return; > + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
Same question here - after all it's called from put_super... So if not having the mutex cause the problem doesn't that mean the mutex is papering over some other problem?
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(auth_tok, auth_tok_tmp, > + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list, > + mount_crypt_stat_list) { > + list_del(&auth_tok->mount_crypt_stat_list); > + mount_crypt_stat->num_global_auth_toks--; > + if (auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key > + && !(auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID)) > + key_put(auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key); > + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache, auth_tok); > + } > + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > memset(mount_crypt_stat, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat)); > } > > @@ -931,6 +954,30 @@ static void ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_flags_to_inode_flags( > crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_VIEW_AS_ENCRYPTED; > } > > +static int ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs( > + struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, > + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat) > +{ > + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; > + int rc = 0; > + > + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > + list_for_each_entry(global_auth_tok, > + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list, > + mount_crypt_stat_list) { > + rc = ecryptfs_add_keysig(crypt_stat, global_auth_tok->sig); > + if (rc) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error adding keysig; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > + mutex_unlock( > + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > + goto out; > + } > + } > + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > +out: > + return rc; > +} > + > /** > * ecryptfs_set_default_crypt_stat_vals > * @crypt_stat > @@ -973,46 +1020,44 @@ static void ecryptfs_set_default_crypt_stat_vals( > /* Associate an authentication token(s) with the file */ > int ecryptfs_new_file_context(struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry) > { > - int rc = 0; > struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat = > &ecryptfs_inode_to_private(ecryptfs_dentry->d_inode)->crypt_stat; > struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat = > &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private( > ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat; > int cipher_name_len; > + int rc = 0; > > ecryptfs_set_default_crypt_stat_vals(crypt_stat, mount_crypt_stat); > - /* See if there are mount crypt options */ > - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Initializing context for new " > - "file using mount_crypt_stat\n"); > - crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED; > - crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID; > - ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_flags_to_inode_flags(crypt_stat, > - mount_crypt_stat); > - memcpy(crypt_stat->keysigs[crypt_stat->num_keysigs++], > - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig, > - ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX); > - cipher_name_len = > - strlen(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name); > - memcpy(crypt_stat->cipher, > - mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name, > - cipher_name_len); > - crypt_stat->cipher[cipher_name_len] = '\0'; > - crypt_stat->key_size = > - mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size; > - ecryptfs_generate_new_key(crypt_stat); > - } else > - /* We should not encounter this scenario since we > - * should detect lack of global_auth_tok at mount time > - * TODO: Applies to 0.1 release only; remove in future > - * release */ > - BUG(); > + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > + BUG_ON(mount_crypt_stat->num_global_auth_toks == 0); > + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > + crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED; > + crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID; > + ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_flags_to_inode_flags(crypt_stat, > + mount_crypt_stat); > + rc = ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs(crypt_stat, > + mount_crypt_stat); > + if (rc) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to copy mount-wide key sigs " > + "to the inode key sigs; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > + goto out; > + } > + cipher_name_len = > + strlen(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name); > + memcpy(crypt_stat->cipher, > + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name, > + cipher_name_len); > + crypt_stat->cipher[cipher_name_len] = '\0'; > + crypt_stat->key_size = > + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size; > + ecryptfs_generate_new_key(crypt_stat); > rc = ecryptfs_init_crypt_ctx(crypt_stat); > if (rc) > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error initializing cryptographic " > "context for cipher [%s]: rc = [%d]\n", > crypt_stat->cipher, rc); > +out: > return rc; > } > > @@ -1776,7 +1821,7 @@ out: > } > > /** > - * ecryptfs_process_cipher - Perform cipher initialization. > + * ecryptfs_process_key_cipher - Perform key cipher initialization. > * @key_tfm: Crypto context for key material, set by this function > * @cipher_name: Name of the cipher > * @key_size: Size of the key in bytes > @@ -1786,8 +1831,8 @@ out: > * event, regardless of whether this function succeeds for fails. > */ > int > -ecryptfs_process_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, char *cipher_name, > - size_t *key_size) > +ecryptfs_process_key_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, > + char *cipher_name, size_t *key_size) > { > char dummy_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES]; > char *full_alg_name; > @@ -1829,3 +1874,98 @@ ecryptfs_process_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, char *cipher_name, > out: > return rc; > } > + > +struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache; > +struct list_head key_tfm_list; > +struct mutex key_tfm_list_mutex; > + > +int ecryptfs_init_crypto(void) > +{ > + mutex_init(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&key_tfm_list); > + return 0; > +} > + > +int ecryptfs_destruct_crypto(void) > +{ > + struct ecryptfs_key_tfm *key_tfm, *key_tfm_tmp; > + > + mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > + list_for_each_entry_safe(key_tfm, key_tfm_tmp, &key_tfm_list, > + key_tfm_list) { > + list_del(&key_tfm->key_tfm_list); > + if (key_tfm->key_tfm) > + crypto_free_blkcipher(key_tfm->key_tfm); > + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache, key_tfm); > + } > + mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > + return 0; > +} > + > +int > +ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(struct ecryptfs_key_tfm **key_tfm, char *cipher_name, > + size_t key_size) > +{ > + struct ecryptfs_key_tfm *tmp_tfm; > + int rc = 0; > + > + tmp_tfm = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (key_tfm != NULL) > + (*key_tfm) = tmp_tfm; > + if (!tmp_tfm) { > + rc = -ENOMEM; > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to allocate from " > + "ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache\n"); > + goto out; > + } > + mutex_init(&tmp_tfm->key_tfm_mutex); > + strncpy(tmp_tfm->cipher_name, cipher_name, > + ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE); > + tmp_tfm->key_size = key_size; > + if ((rc = ecryptfs_process_key_cipher(&tmp_tfm->key_tfm, > + tmp_tfm->cipher_name, > + &tmp_tfm->key_size))) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize key TFM " > + "cipher with name = [%s]; rc = [%d]\n", > + tmp_tfm->cipher_name, rc); > + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache, tmp_tfm); > + if (key_tfm != NULL) > + (*key_tfm) = NULL; > + goto out; > + } > + mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > + list_add(&tmp_tfm->key_tfm_list, &key_tfm_list); > + mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > +out: > + return rc; > +} > + > +int ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(struct crypto_blkcipher **tfm, > + struct mutex **tfm_mutex, > + char *cipher_name) > +{ > + struct ecryptfs_key_tfm *key_tfm; > + int rc = 0; > + > + (*tfm) = NULL; > + (*tfm_mutex) = NULL; > + mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > + list_for_each_entry(key_tfm, &key_tfm_list, key_tfm_list) { > + if (strcmp(key_tfm->cipher_name, cipher_name) == 0) { > + (*tfm) = key_tfm->key_tfm; > + (*tfm_mutex) = &key_tfm->key_tfm_mutex; > + mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > + goto out; > + } > + } > + mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > + if ((rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(&key_tfm, cipher_name, 0))) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error adding new key_tfm to list; rc = [%d]\n", > + rc); > + goto out; > + } > + (*tfm) = key_tfm->key_tfm; > + (*tfm_mutex) = &key_tfm->key_tfm_mutex; > +out: > + return rc; > +} > diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h > index 1b9dd9a..6ddab6c 100644 > --- a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h > +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h > @@ -48,10 +48,12 @@ > #define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH 0x00000004 > #define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_POLICY 0x00000008 > #define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_XATTR 0x00000010 > +#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MULTKEY 0x00000020 > #define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MASK (ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PASSPHRASE \ > | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH \ > | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PUBKEY \ > - | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_XATTR) > + | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_XATTR \ > + | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MULTKEY) > #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH 64 > #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_PASSPHRASE_BYTES ECRYPTFS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH > #define ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE 8 > @@ -144,6 +146,7 @@ struct ecryptfs_private_key { > struct ecryptfs_auth_tok { > u16 version; /* 8-bit major and 8-bit minor */ > u16 token_type; > +#define ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPT_ONLY 0x00000001 > u32 flags; > struct ecryptfs_session_key session_key; > u8 reserved[32]; > @@ -153,6 +156,7 @@ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok { > } token; > } __attribute__ ((packed)); > > +int ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(char **sig, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok); > void ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok); > extern void ecryptfs_to_hex(char *dst, char *src, size_t src_size); > extern void ecryptfs_from_hex(char *dst, char *src, int dst_size); > @@ -194,7 +198,6 @@ ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(struct key *key) > #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEYSET_SIZE 1024 > #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE 32 > #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_NUM_ENC_KEYS 64 > -#define ECRYPTFS_MAX_NUM_KEYSIGS 2 /* TODO: Make this a linked list */ > #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_IV_BYTES 16 /* 128 bits */ > #define ECRYPTFS_SALT_BYTES 2 > #define MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER 0x3c81b7f5 > @@ -212,6 +215,11 @@ ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(struct key *key) > #define ECRYPTFS_TAG_67_PACKET_TYPE 0x43 > #define MD5_DIGEST_SIZE 16 > > +struct ecryptfs_key_sig { > + struct list_head crypt_stat_list; > + char keysig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX]; > +}; > + > /** > * This is the primary struct associated with each encrypted file. > * > @@ -231,7 +239,6 @@ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat { > u32 flags; > unsigned int file_version; > size_t iv_bytes; > - size_t num_keysigs; > size_t header_extent_size; > size_t num_header_extents_at_front; > size_t extent_size; /* Data extent size; default is 4096 */ > @@ -245,7 +252,8 @@ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat { > unsigned char cipher[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE]; > unsigned char key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES]; > unsigned char root_iv[ECRYPTFS_MAX_IV_BYTES]; > - unsigned char keysigs[ECRYPTFS_MAX_NUM_KEYSIGS][ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX]; > + struct list_head keysig_list; > + struct mutex keysig_list_mutex; > struct mutex cs_tfm_mutex; > struct mutex cs_hash_tfm_mutex; > struct mutex cs_mutex; > @@ -265,6 +273,26 @@ struct ecryptfs_dentry_info { > struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat; > }; > > +struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok { > +#define ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID 0x00000001 > + u32 flags; > + struct list_head mount_crypt_stat_list; > + struct key *global_auth_tok_key; > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; > + unsigned char sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX + 1]; > +}; > + > +struct ecryptfs_key_tfm { > + struct crypto_blkcipher *key_tfm; > + size_t key_size; > + struct mutex key_tfm_mutex; > + struct list_head key_tfm_list; > + unsigned char cipher_name[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE + 1]; > +}; > + > +extern struct list_head key_tfm_list; > +extern struct mutex key_tfm_list_mutex; > + > /** > * This struct is to enable a mount-wide passphrase/salt combo. This > * is more or less a stopgap to provide similar functionality to other > @@ -276,15 +304,14 @@ struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat { > #define ECRYPTFS_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH_ENABLED 0x00000001 > #define ECRYPTFS_XATTR_METADATA_ENABLED 0x00000002 > #define ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED 0x00000004 > +#define ECRYPTFS_MOUNT_CRYPT_STAT_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 > u32 flags; > - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; > - struct key *global_auth_tok_key; > + struct list_head global_auth_tok_list; > + struct mutex global_auth_tok_list_mutex; > + size_t num_global_auth_toks; > size_t global_default_cipher_key_size; > - struct crypto_blkcipher *global_key_tfm; > - struct mutex global_key_tfm_mutex; > unsigned char global_default_cipher_name[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE > + 1]; > - unsigned char global_auth_tok_sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX + 1]; > }; > > /* superblock private data. */ > @@ -468,6 +495,9 @@ extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_header_cache_2; > extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_xattr_cache; > extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_lower_page_cache; > extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_record_cache; > +extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_sig_cache; > +extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache; > +extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache; > > int ecryptfs_interpose(struct dentry *hidden_dentry, > struct dentry *this_dentry, struct super_block *sb, > @@ -538,9 +568,8 @@ int > ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, > unsigned char *src, struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry); > int ecryptfs_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t new_length); > -int > -ecryptfs_process_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, char *cipher_name, > - size_t *key_size); > +int ecryptfs_process_key_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, > + char *cipher_name, size_t *key_size); > int ecryptfs_inode_test(struct inode *inode, void *candidate_lower_inode); > int ecryptfs_inode_set(struct inode *inode, void *lower_inode); > void ecryptfs_init_inode(struct inode *inode, struct inode *lower_inode); > @@ -580,6 +609,24 @@ void > ecryptfs_write_header_metadata(char *virt, > struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, > size_t *written); > +int ecryptfs_add_keysig(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, char *sig); > +int > +ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, > + char *sig); > +int ecryptfs_get_global_auth_tok_for_sig( > + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok **global_auth_tok, > + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, char *sig); > +int > +ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(struct ecryptfs_key_tfm **key_tfm, char *cipher_name, > + size_t key_size); > +int ecryptfs_init_crypto(void); > +int ecryptfs_destruct_crypto(void); > +int ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(struct crypto_blkcipher **tfm, > + struct mutex **tfm_mutex, > + char *cipher_name); > +int ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(struct key **auth_tok_key, > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok **auth_tok, > + char *sig); > int ecryptfs_write_zeros(struct file *file, pgoff_t index, int start, > int num_zeros); > > diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c > index b550dea..ef4904a 100644 > --- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c > +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c > @@ -402,20 +402,24 @@ out: > * > * Returns Zero on success; non-zero error otherwise. > */ > -static int decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key( > - struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, > - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > - struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) > +static int > +decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > + struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) > { > u16 cipher_code = 0; > struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *msg_ctx; > struct ecryptfs_message *msg = NULL; > + char *auth_tok_sig; > char *netlink_message; > size_t netlink_message_length; > int rc; > > - rc = write_tag_64_packet(mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig, > - &(auth_tok->session_key), > + if ((rc = ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(&auth_tok_sig, auth_tok))) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Unrecognized auth tok type: [%d]\n", > + auth_tok->token_type); > + goto out; > + } > + rc = write_tag_64_packet(auth_tok_sig, &(auth_tok->session_key), > &netlink_message, &netlink_message_length); > if (rc) { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Failed to write tag 64 packet"); > @@ -921,126 +925,241 @@ out: > return rc; > } > > +static int > +ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig( > + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok **global_auth_tok, > + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, char *sig) > +{ > + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *walker; > + int rc = 0; > + > + (*global_auth_tok) = NULL; > + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > + list_for_each_entry(walker, > + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list, > + mount_crypt_stat_list) { > + if (memcmp(walker->sig, sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX) == 0) { > + (*global_auth_tok) = walker; > + goto out; > + } > + } > + rc = -EINVAL; > +out: > + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > + return rc; > +} > + > /** > - * decrypt_session_key - Decrypt the session key with the given auth_tok. > + * ecryptfs_verify_version > + * @version: The version number to confirm > + * > + * Returns zero on good version; non-zero otherwise > + */ > +static int ecryptfs_verify_version(u16 version) > +{ > + int rc = 0; > + unsigned char major; > + unsigned char minor; > + > + major = ((version >> 8) & 0xFF); > + minor = (version & 0xFF); > + if (major != ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR) { > + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Major version number mismatch. " > + "Expected [%d]; got [%d]\n", > + ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR, major); > + rc = -EINVAL; > + goto out; > + } > + if (minor != ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR) { > + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Minor version number mismatch. " > + "Expected [%d]; got [%d]\n", > + ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR, minor); > + rc = -EINVAL; > + goto out; > + } > +out: > + return rc; > +} > + > +int ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(struct key **auth_tok_key, > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok **auth_tok, > + char *sig) > +{ > + int rc = 0; > + > + (*auth_tok_key) = request_key(&key_type_user, sig, NULL); > + if (!(*auth_tok_key) || IS_ERR(*auth_tok_key)) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Could not find key with description: [%s]\n", > + sig); > + process_request_key_err(PTR_ERR(*auth_tok_key)); > + rc = -EINVAL; > + goto out; > + } > + (*auth_tok) = ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(*auth_tok_key); > + if (ecryptfs_verify_version((*auth_tok)->version)) { > + printk(KERN_ERR > + "Data structure version mismatch. " > + "Userspace tools must match eCryptfs " > + "kernel module with major version [%d] " > + "and minor version [%d]\n", > + ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR, > + ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR); > + rc = -EINVAL; > + goto out; > + } > + if ((*auth_tok)->token_type != ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD > + && (*auth_tok)->token_type != ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Invalid auth_tok structure " > + "returned from key query\n"); > + rc = -EINVAL; > + goto out; > + } > +out: > + return rc; > +} > + > +/** > + * ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig > + * @auth_tok: Set to the matching auth_tok; NULL if not found > + * @crypt_stat: inode crypt_stat crypto context > + * @sig: Sig of auth_tok to find > + * > + * For now, this function simply looks at the registered auth_tok's > + * linked off the mount_crypt_stat, so all the auth_toks that can be > + * used must be registered at mount time. This function could > + * potentially try a lot harder to find auth_tok's (e.g., by calling > + * out to ecryptfsd to dynamically retrieve an auth_tok object) so > + * that static registration of auth_tok's will no longer be necessary. > + * > + * Returns zero on no error; non-zero on error > + */ > +static int > +ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig( > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok **auth_tok, > + struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, char *sig) > +{ > + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat = > + crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat; > + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; > + int rc = 0; > + > + (*auth_tok) = NULL; > + if (ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig(&global_auth_tok, > + mount_crypt_stat, sig)) { > + struct key *auth_tok_key; > + > + rc = ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(&auth_tok_key, auth_tok, > + sig); > + } else > + (*auth_tok) = global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok; > + return rc; > +} > + > +/** > + * decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key - Decrypt the session key > + * with the given auth_tok. > * > * Returns Zero on success; non-zero error otherwise. > */ > -static int decrypt_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > - struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) > +static int > +decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > + struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) > { > - struct ecryptfs_password *password_s_ptr; > - struct scatterlist src_sg[2], dst_sg[2]; > + struct scatterlist dst_sg; > + struct scatterlist src_sg; > struct mutex *tfm_mutex = NULL; > - char *encrypted_session_key; > - char *session_key; > struct blkcipher_desc desc = { > .flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP > }; > int rc = 0; > > - password_s_ptr = &auth_tok->token.password; > - if (password_s_ptr->flags & ECRYPTFS_SESSION_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET) > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key " > - "set; skipping key generation\n"); > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key (size [%d])" > - ":\n", > - password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key_bytes); > - if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) > - ecryptfs_dump_hex(password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key, > - password_s_ptr-> > - session_key_encryption_key_bytes); > - if (!strcmp(crypt_stat->cipher, > - crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name) > - && crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm) { > - desc.tfm = crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm; > - tfm_mutex = &crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm_mutex; > - } else { > - char *full_alg_name; > - > - rc = ecryptfs_crypto_api_algify_cipher_name(&full_alg_name, > - crypt_stat->cipher, > - "ecb"); > - if (rc) > - goto out; > - desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(full_alg_name, 0, > - CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); > - kfree(full_alg_name); > - if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm)) { > - rc = PTR_ERR(desc.tfm); > - printk(KERN_ERR "Error allocating crypto context; " > - "rc = [%d]\n", rc); > - goto out; > - } > - crypto_blkcipher_set_flags(desc.tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY); > + if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) { > + ecryptfs_printk( > + KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key (size [%d]):\n", > + auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_bytes); > + ecryptfs_dump_hex( > + auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key, > + auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_bytes); > + } > + rc = ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(&desc.tfm, &tfm_mutex, > + crypt_stat->cipher); > + if (unlikely(rc)) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to get " > + "tfm and mutex for cipher name [%s]; rc = [%d]\n", > + crypt_stat->cipher, rc); > + goto out; > } > - if (tfm_mutex) > - mutex_lock(tfm_mutex); > - rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc.tfm, > - password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key, > - crypt_stat->key_size); > - if (rc < 0) { > + if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, > + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size, > + &src_sg, 1)) != 1) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to convert " > + "auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key to scatterlist; " > + "expected rc = 1; got rc = [%d]. " > + "auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = [%d]\n", rc, > + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size); > + goto out; > + } > + auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size = > + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; > + if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key, > + auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size, > + &dst_sg, 1)) != 1) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to convert " > + "auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key to scatterlist; " > + "expected rc = 1; got rc = [%d]\n", rc); > + goto out; > + } > + mutex_lock(tfm_mutex); > + rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey( > + desc.tfm, auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key, > + crypt_stat->key_size); > + if (unlikely(rc < 0)) { > + mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); > printk(KERN_ERR "Error setting key for crypto context\n"); > rc = -EINVAL; > - goto out_free_tfm; > - } > - /* TODO: virt_to_scatterlist */ > - encrypted_session_key = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); > - if (!encrypted_session_key) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Out of memory\n"); > - rc = -ENOMEM; > - goto out_free_tfm; > + goto out; > } > - session_key = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); > - if (!session_key) { > - kfree(encrypted_session_key); > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Out of memory\n"); > - rc = -ENOMEM; > - goto out_free_tfm; > - } > - memcpy(encrypted_session_key, auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, > - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size); > - src_sg[0].page = virt_to_page(encrypted_session_key); > - src_sg[0].offset = 0; > - BUG_ON(auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size > PAGE_CACHE_SIZE); > - src_sg[0].length = auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; > - dst_sg[0].page = virt_to_page(session_key); > - dst_sg[0].offset = 0; > - auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size = > - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; > - dst_sg[0].length = auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; > - rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, dst_sg, src_sg, > + rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, &dst_sg, &src_sg, > auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size); > - if (rc) { > + mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); > + if (unlikely(rc)) { > printk(KERN_ERR "Error decrypting; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > - goto out_free_memory; > + goto out; > } > - auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size = > - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; > - memcpy(auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key, session_key, > - auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size); > auth_tok->session_key.flags |= ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_DECRYPTED_KEY; > memcpy(crypt_stat->key, auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key, > auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size); > crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID; > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Decrypted session key:\n"); > - if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) > + if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) { > + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "FEK of size [%d]:\n", > + crypt_stat->key_size); > ecryptfs_dump_hex(crypt_stat->key, > crypt_stat->key_size); > -out_free_memory: > - memset(encrypted_session_key, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE); > - free_page((unsigned long)encrypted_session_key); > - memset(session_key, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE); > - free_page((unsigned long)session_key); > -out_free_tfm: > - if (tfm_mutex) > - mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); > - else > - crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm); > + } > out: > return rc; > } > > +int ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(char **sig, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok) > +{ > + int rc = 0; > + > + (*sig) = NULL; > + switch (auth_tok->token_type) { > + case ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD: > + (*sig) = auth_tok->token.password.signature; > + break; > + case ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY: > + (*sig) = auth_tok->token.private_key.signature; > + break; > + default: > + printk(KERN_ERR "Cannot get sig for auth_tok of type [%d]\n", > + auth_tok->token_type); > + rc = -EINVAL; > + } > + return rc; > +} > + > /** > * ecryptfs_parse_packet_set > * @dest: The header page in memory > @@ -1058,25 +1177,22 @@ int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, > struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry) > { > size_t i = 0; > - size_t found_auth_tok = 0; > + size_t found_auth_tok; > size_t next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet; > - char sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX]; > struct list_head auth_tok_list; > - struct list_head *walker; > - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *chosen_auth_tok = NULL; > - struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat = > - &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private( > - ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat; > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *matching_auth_tok = NULL; > struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *candidate_auth_tok = NULL; > + char *candidate_auth_tok_sig; > size_t packet_size; > struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *new_auth_tok; > unsigned char sig_tmp_space[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE]; > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item; > size_t tag_11_contents_size; > size_t tag_11_packet_size; > int rc = 0; > > INIT_LIST_HEAD(&auth_tok_list); > - /* Parse the header to find as many packets as we can, these will be > + /* Parse the header to find as many packets as we can; these will be > * added the our &auth_tok_list */ > next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet = 1; > while (next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet) { > @@ -1155,73 +1271,86 @@ int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, > } > } > if (list_empty(&auth_tok_list)) { > - rc = -EINVAL; /* Do not support non-encrypted files in > - * the 0.1 release */ > + printk(KERN_ERR "The lower file appears to be a non-encrypted " > + "eCryptfs file; this is not supported in this version " > + "of the eCryptfs kernel module\n"); > + rc = -EINVAL; > goto out; > } > - /* If we have a global auth tok, then we should try to use > - * it */ > - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok) { > - memcpy(sig, mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig, > - ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX); > - chosen_auth_tok = mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok; > - } else > - BUG(); /* We should always have a global auth tok in > - * the 0.1 release */ > - /* Scan list to see if our chosen_auth_tok works */ > - list_for_each(walker, &auth_tok_list) { > - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item; > - auth_tok_list_item = > - list_entry(walker, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item, > - list); > + /* auth_tok_list contains the set of authentication tokens > + * parsed from the metadata. We need to find a matching > + * authentication token that has the secret component(s) > + * necessary to decrypt the EFEK in the auth_tok parsed from > + * the metadata. There may be several potential matches, but > + * just one will be sufficient to decrypt to get the FEK. */ > +find_next_matching_auth_tok: > + found_auth_tok = 0; > + list_for_each_entry(auth_tok_list_item, &auth_tok_list, list) { > candidate_auth_tok = &auth_tok_list_item->auth_tok; > if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, > "Considering cadidate auth tok:\n"); > ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok(candidate_auth_tok); > } > - /* TODO: Replace ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX w/ dynamic value */ > - if (candidate_auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD > - && !strncmp(candidate_auth_tok->token.password.signature, > - sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX)) { > - found_auth_tok = 1; > - goto leave_list; > - /* TODO: Transfer the common salt into the > - * crypt_stat salt */ > - } else if ((candidate_auth_tok->token_type > - == ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) > - && !strncmp(candidate_auth_tok->token.private_key.signature, > - sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX)) { > + if ((rc = ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(&candidate_auth_tok_sig, > + candidate_auth_tok))) { > + printk(KERN_ERR > + "Unrecognized candidate auth tok type: [%d]\n", > + candidate_auth_tok->token_type); > + rc = -EINVAL; > + goto out_wipe_list; > + } > + if ((rc = ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig( > + &matching_auth_tok, crypt_stat, > + candidate_auth_tok_sig))) > + rc = 0; > + if (matching_auth_tok) { > found_auth_tok = 1; > - goto leave_list; > + goto found_matching_auth_tok; > } > } > if (!found_auth_tok) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not find authentication " > - "token on temporary list for sig [%.*s]\n", > - ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX, sig); > + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not find a usable " > + "authentication token\n"); > rc = -EIO; > goto out_wipe_list; > } > -leave_list: > - rc = -ENOTSUPP; > +found_matching_auth_tok: > if (candidate_auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) { > memcpy(&(candidate_auth_tok->token.private_key), > - &(chosen_auth_tok->token.private_key), > + &(matching_auth_tok->token.private_key), > sizeof(struct ecryptfs_private_key)); > - rc = decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(mount_crypt_stat, > - candidate_auth_tok, > + rc = decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(candidate_auth_tok, > crypt_stat); > } else if (candidate_auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD) { > memcpy(&(candidate_auth_tok->token.password), > - &(chosen_auth_tok->token.password), > + &(matching_auth_tok->token.password), > sizeof(struct ecryptfs_password)); > - rc = decrypt_session_key(candidate_auth_tok, crypt_stat); > + rc = decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key( > + candidate_auth_tok, crypt_stat); > } > if (rc) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error decrypting the " > - "session key; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > - goto out_wipe_list; > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item_tmp; > + > + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error decrypting the " > + "session key for authentication token with sig " > + "[%.*s]; rc = [%d]. Removing auth tok " > + "candidate from the list and searching for " > + "the next match.\n", candidate_auth_tok_sig, > + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX, rc); > + list_for_each_entry_safe(auth_tok_list_item, > + auth_tok_list_item_tmp, > + &auth_tok_list, list) { > + if (candidate_auth_tok > + == &auth_tok_list_item->auth_tok) { > + list_del(&auth_tok_list_item->list); > + kmem_cache_free( > + ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item_cache, > + auth_tok_list_item); > + goto find_next_matching_auth_tok; > + } > + } > + BUG(); > } > rc = ecryptfs_compute_root_iv(crypt_stat); > if (rc) { > @@ -1240,6 +1369,7 @@ out_wipe_list: > out: > return rc; > } > + > static int > pki_encrypt_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, > @@ -1291,15 +1421,15 @@ out: > * Returns zero on success; non-zero on error. > */ > static int > -write_tag_1_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > +write_tag_1_packet(char *dest, size_t *remaining_bytes, > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, > - struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, > struct ecryptfs_key_record *key_rec, size_t *packet_size) > { > size_t i; > size_t encrypted_session_key_valid = 0; > - size_t key_rec_size; > size_t packet_size_length; > + size_t max_packet_size; > int rc = 0; > > (*packet_size) = 0; > @@ -1329,37 +1459,23 @@ write_tag_1_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > ecryptfs_dump_hex(key_rec->enc_key, key_rec->enc_key_size); > } > encrypted_session_key_set: > - /* Now we have a valid key_rec. Append it to the > - * key_rec set. */ > - key_rec_size = (sizeof(struct ecryptfs_key_record) > - - ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES > - + (key_rec->enc_key_size)); > - /* TODO: Include a packet size limit as a parameter to this > - * function once we have multi-packet headers (for versions > - * later than 0.1 */ > - if (key_rec_size >= ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEYSET_SIZE) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Keyset too large\n"); > - rc = -EINVAL; > - goto out; > - } > - /* ***** TAG 1 Packet Format ***** > - * | version number | 1 byte | > - * | key ID | 8 bytes | > - * | public key algorithm | 1 byte | > - * | encrypted session key | arbitrary | > - */ > - if ((0x02 + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + key_rec->enc_key_size) >= max) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, > - "Authentication token is too large\n"); > + /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440 > + * packet tag 1 */ > + max_packet_size = (1 /* Tag 1 identifier */ > + + 3 /* Max Tag 1 packet size */ > + + 1 /* Version */ > + + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE /* Key identifier */ > + + 1 /* Cipher identifier */ > + + key_rec->enc_key_size); /* Encrypted key size */ > + if (max_packet_size > (*remaining_bytes)) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Packet length larger than maximum allowable; " > + "need up to [%d] bytes, but there are only [%d] " > + "available\n", max_packet_size, (*remaining_bytes)); > rc = -EINVAL; > goto out; > } > dest[(*packet_size)++] = ECRYPTFS_TAG_1_PACKET_TYPE; > - /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440 > - * packet tag 1 */ > - rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)], > - (0x02 + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + > - key_rec->enc_key_size), > + rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)], (max_packet_size - 4), > &packet_size_length); > if (rc) { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating tag 1 packet " > @@ -1377,6 +1493,8 @@ encrypted_session_key_set: > out: > if (rc) > (*packet_size) = 0; > + else > + (*remaining_bytes) -= (*packet_size); > return rc; > } > > @@ -1448,19 +1566,22 @@ write_tag_11_packet(char *dest, int max, char *contents, size_t contents_length, > * Returns zero on success; non-zero on error. > */ > static int > -write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > +write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t *remaining_bytes, > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, > struct ecryptfs_key_record *key_rec, size_t *packet_size) > { > size_t i; > size_t encrypted_session_key_valid = 0; > char session_key_encryption_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES]; > - struct scatterlist dest_sg[2]; > - struct scatterlist src_sg[2]; > + struct scatterlist dst_sg; > + struct scatterlist src_sg; > struct mutex *tfm_mutex = NULL; > - size_t key_rec_size; > - size_t packet_size_length; > size_t cipher_code; > + size_t packet_size_length; > + size_t max_packet_size; > + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat = > + crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat; > struct blkcipher_desc desc = { > .tfm = NULL, > .flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP > @@ -1470,16 +1591,25 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > (*packet_size) = 0; > ecryptfs_from_hex(key_rec->sig, auth_tok->token.password.signature, > ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE); > - encrypted_session_key_valid = 0; > - for (i = 0; i < crypt_stat->key_size; i++) > - encrypted_session_key_valid |= > - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key[i]; > - if (encrypted_session_key_valid) { > - memcpy(key_rec->enc_key, > - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, > - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size); > - goto encrypted_session_key_set; > + rc = ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(&desc.tfm, &tfm_mutex, > + crypt_stat->cipher); > + if (unlikely(rc)) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to get " > + "tfm and mutex for cipher name [%s]; rc = [%d]\n", > + crypt_stat->cipher, rc); > + goto out; > + } > + if (mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size == 0) { > + struct blkcipher_alg *alg = crypto_blkcipher_alg(desc.tfm); > + > + printk(KERN_WARNING "No key size specified at mount; " > + "defaulting to [%d]\n", alg->max_keysize); > + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size = > + alg->max_keysize; > } > + if (crypt_stat->key_size == 0) > + crypt_stat->key_size = > + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size; > if (auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size == 0) > auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = > crypt_stat->key_size; > @@ -1487,9 +1617,24 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > && strcmp("aes", crypt_stat->cipher) == 0) { > memset((crypt_stat->key + 24), 0, 8); > auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = 32; > - } > + } else > + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = crypt_stat->key_size; > key_rec->enc_key_size = > auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; > + encrypted_session_key_valid = 0; > + for (i = 0; i < auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; i++) > + encrypted_session_key_valid |= > + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key[i]; > + if (encrypted_session_key_valid) { > + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "encrypted_session_key_valid != 0; " > + "using auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, " > + "where key_rec->enc_key_size = [%d]\n", > + key_rec->enc_key_size); > + memcpy(key_rec->enc_key, > + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, > + key_rec->enc_key_size); > + goto encrypted_session_key_set; > + } > if (auth_tok->token.password.flags & > ECRYPTFS_SESSION_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET) { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Using previously generated " > @@ -1508,54 +1653,32 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key:\n"); > ecryptfs_dump_hex(session_key_encryption_key, 16); > } > - rc = virt_to_scatterlist(crypt_stat->key, > - key_rec->enc_key_size, src_sg, 2); > - if (!rc) { > + if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(crypt_stat->key, > + key_rec->enc_key_size, &src_sg, 1)) > + != 1) { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating scatterlist " > - "for crypt_stat session key\n"); > + "for crypt_stat session key; expected rc = 1; " > + "got rc = [%d]. key_rec->enc_key_size = [%d]\n", > + rc, key_rec->enc_key_size); > rc = -ENOMEM; > goto out; > } > - rc = virt_to_scatterlist(key_rec->enc_key, > - key_rec->enc_key_size, dest_sg, 2); > - if (!rc) { > + if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(key_rec->enc_key, > + key_rec->enc_key_size, &dst_sg, 1)) > + != 1) { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating scatterlist " > - "for crypt_stat encrypted session key\n"); > + "for crypt_stat encrypted session key; " > + "expected rc = 1; got rc = [%d]. " > + "key_rec->enc_key_size = [%d]\n", rc, > + key_rec->enc_key_size); > rc = -ENOMEM; > goto out; > } > - if (!strcmp(crypt_stat->cipher, > - crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name) > - && crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm) { > - desc.tfm = crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm; > - tfm_mutex = &crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm_mutex; > - } else { > - char *full_alg_name; > - > - rc = ecryptfs_crypto_api_algify_cipher_name(&full_alg_name, > - crypt_stat->cipher, > - "ecb"); > - if (rc) > - goto out; > - desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(full_alg_name, 0, > - CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); > - kfree(full_alg_name); > - if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm)) { > - rc = PTR_ERR(desc.tfm); > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not initialize crypto " > - "context for cipher [%s]; rc = [%d]\n", > - crypt_stat->cipher, rc); > - goto out; > - } > - crypto_blkcipher_set_flags(desc.tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY); > - } > - if (tfm_mutex) > - mutex_lock(tfm_mutex); > + mutex_lock(tfm_mutex); > rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc.tfm, session_key_encryption_key, > crypt_stat->key_size); > if (rc < 0) { > - if (tfm_mutex) > - mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); > + mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error setting key for crypto " > "context; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > goto out; > @@ -1563,56 +1686,53 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > rc = 0; > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Encrypting [%d] bytes of the key\n", > crypt_stat->key_size); > - rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, dest_sg, src_sg, > + rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &dst_sg, &src_sg, > (*key_rec).enc_key_size); > + mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); > if (rc) { > printk(KERN_ERR "Error encrypting; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > goto out; > } > - if (tfm_mutex) > - mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "This should be the encrypted key:\n"); > - if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) > + if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) { > + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "EFEK of size [%d]:\n", > + key_rec->enc_key_size); > ecryptfs_dump_hex(key_rec->enc_key, > key_rec->enc_key_size); > -encrypted_session_key_set: > - /* Now we have a valid key_rec. Append it to the > - * key_rec set. */ > - key_rec_size = (sizeof(struct ecryptfs_key_record) > - - ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES > - + (key_rec->enc_key_size)); > - /* TODO: Include a packet size limit as a parameter to this > - * function once we have multi-packet headers (for versions > - * later than 0.1 */ > - if (key_rec_size >= ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEYSET_SIZE) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Keyset too large\n"); > - rc = -EINVAL; > - goto out; > } > - /* TODO: Packet size limit */ > - /* We have 5 bytes of surrounding packet data */ > - if ((0x05 + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE > - + key_rec->enc_key_size) >= max) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Authentication token is too " > - "large\n"); > +encrypted_session_key_set: > + /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440 > + * packet tag 3 */ > + max_packet_size = (1 /* Tag 3 identifier */ > + + 3 /* Max Tag 3 packet size */ > + + 1 /* Version */ > + + 1 /* Cipher code */ > + + 1 /* S2K specifier */ > + + 1 /* Hash identifier */ > + + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE /* Salt */ > + + 1 /* Hash iterations */ > + + key_rec->enc_key_size); /* Encrypted key size */ > + if (max_packet_size > (*remaining_bytes)) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Packet too large; need up to [%d] bytes, but " > + "there are only [%d] available\n", max_packet_size, > + (*remaining_bytes)); > rc = -EINVAL; > goto out; > } > - /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440 > - * packet tag 3 */ > dest[(*packet_size)++] = ECRYPTFS_TAG_3_PACKET_TYPE; > - /* ver+cipher+s2k+hash+salt+iter+enc_key */ > - rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)], > - (0x05 + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE > - + key_rec->enc_key_size), > + /* Chop off the Tag 3 identifier(1) and Tag 3 packet size(3) > + * to get the number of octets in the actual Tag 3 packet */ > + rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)], (max_packet_size - 4), > &packet_size_length); > if (rc) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating tag 3 packet " > - "header; cannot generate packet length\n"); > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error generating tag 3 packet header; cannot " > + "generate packet length. rc = [%d]\n", rc); > goto out; > } > (*packet_size) += packet_size_length; > dest[(*packet_size)++] = 0x04; /* version 4 */ > + /* TODO: Break from RFC2440 so that arbitrary ciphers can be > + * specified with strings */ > cipher_code = ecryptfs_code_for_cipher_string(crypt_stat); > if (cipher_code == 0) { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Unable to generate code for " > @@ -1631,10 +1751,10 @@ encrypted_session_key_set: > key_rec->enc_key_size); > (*packet_size) += key_rec->enc_key_size; > out: > - if (desc.tfm && !tfm_mutex) > - crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm); > if (rc) > (*packet_size) = 0; > + else > + (*remaining_bytes) -= (*packet_size); > return rc; > } > > @@ -1662,24 +1782,43 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base, > size_t max) > { > struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok; > + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; > struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat = > &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private( > ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat; > size_t written; > struct ecryptfs_key_record *key_rec; > + struct ecryptfs_key_sig *key_sig; > int rc = 0; > > (*len) = 0; > + mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); > key_rec = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_key_record_cache, GFP_KERNEL); > if (!key_rec) { > rc = -ENOMEM; > goto out; > } > - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok) { > - auth_tok = mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok; > + list_for_each_entry(key_sig, &crypt_stat->keysig_list, > + crypt_stat_list) { > + memset(key_rec, 0, sizeof(*key_rec)); > + rc = ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig(&global_auth_tok, > + mount_crypt_stat, > + key_sig->keysig); > + if (rc) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to get the global " > + "auth_tok; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > + goto out_free; > + } > + if (global_auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID) { > + printk(KERN_WARNING > + "Skipping invalid auth tok with sig = [%s]\n", > + global_auth_tok->sig); > + continue; > + } > + auth_tok = global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok; > if (auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD) { > rc = write_tag_3_packet((dest_base + (*len)), > - max, auth_tok, > + &max, auth_tok, > crypt_stat, key_rec, > &written); > if (rc) { > @@ -1689,10 +1828,9 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base, > } > (*len) += written; > /* Write auth tok signature packet */ > - rc = write_tag_11_packet( > - (dest_base + (*len)), > - (max - (*len)), > - key_rec->sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE, &written); > + rc = write_tag_11_packet((dest_base + (*len)), &max, > + key_rec->sig, > + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE, &written); > if (rc) { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error writing " > "auth tok signature packet\n"); > @@ -1701,9 +1839,8 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base, > (*len) += written; > } else if (auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) { > rc = write_tag_1_packet(dest_base + (*len), > - max, auth_tok, > - crypt_stat,mount_crypt_stat, > - key_rec, &written); > + &max, auth_tok, > + crypt_stat, key_rec, &written); > if (rc) { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error " > "writing tag 1 packet\n"); > @@ -1716,19 +1853,69 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base, > rc = -EINVAL; > goto out_free; > } > - } else > - BUG(); > - if (likely((max - (*len)) > 0)) { > + } > + if (likely(max > 0)) { > dest_base[(*len)] = 0x00; > } else { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error writing boundary byte\n"); > rc = -EIO; > } > - > out_free: > kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_record_cache, key_rec); > out: > if (rc) > (*len) = 0; > + mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); > + return rc; > +} > + > +struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_sig_cache; > + > +int ecryptfs_add_keysig(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, char *sig) > +{ > + struct ecryptfs_key_sig *new_key_sig; > + int rc = 0; > + > + new_key_sig = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_key_sig_cache, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!new_key_sig) { > + rc = -ENOMEM; > + printk(KERN_ERR > + "Error allocating from ecryptfs_key_sig_cache\n"); > + goto out; > + } > + memcpy(new_key_sig->keysig, sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX); > + mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); > + list_add(&new_key_sig->crypt_stat_list, &crypt_stat->keysig_list); > + mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); > +out: > return rc; > } > + > +struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache; > + > +int > +ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, > + char *sig) > +{ > + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *new_auth_tok; > + int rc = 0; > + > + new_auth_tok = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache, > + GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!new_auth_tok) { > + rc = -ENOMEM; > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error allocating from " > + "ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache\n"); > + goto out; > + } > + memcpy(new_auth_tok->sig, sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX); > + new_auth_tok->sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX] = '\0'; > + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > + list_add(&new_auth_tok->mount_crypt_stat_list, > + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list); > + mount_crypt_stat->num_global_auth_toks++; > + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > +out: > + return rc; > +} > + > diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c > index 606128f..5da6180 100644 > --- a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c > +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c > @@ -179,38 +179,40 @@ static match_table_t tokens = { > {ecryptfs_opt_err, NULL} > }; > > -/** > - * ecryptfs_verify_version > - * @version: The version number to confirm > - * > - * Returns zero on good version; non-zero otherwise > - */ > -static int ecryptfs_verify_version(u16 version) > +static int ecryptfs_init_global_auth_toks( > + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat) > { > + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; > int rc = 0; > - unsigned char major; > - unsigned char minor; > - > - major = ((version >> 8) & 0xFF); > - minor = (version & 0xFF); > - if (major != ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Major version number mismatch. " > - "Expected [%d]; got [%d]\n", > - ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR, major); > - rc = -EINVAL; > - goto out; > - } > - if (minor != ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Minor version number mismatch. " > - "Expected [%d]; got [%d]\n", > - ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR, minor); > - rc = -EINVAL; > - goto out; > + > + list_for_each_entry(global_auth_tok, > + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list, > + mount_crypt_stat_list) { > + if ((rc = ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig( > + &global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key, > + &global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok, > + global_auth_tok->sig))) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Could not find valid key in user " > + "session keyring for sig specified in mount " > + "option: [%s]\n", global_auth_tok->sig); > + global_auth_tok->flags |= ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID; > + rc = 0; > + } else > + global_auth_tok->flags &= ~ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID; > } > -out: > return rc; > } > > +static void ecryptfs_init_mount_crypt_stat( > + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat) > +{ > + memset((void *)mount_crypt_stat, 0, > + sizeof(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat)); > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list); > + mutex_init(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > + mount_crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_MOUNT_CRYPT_STAT_INITIALIZED; > +} > + > /** > * ecryptfs_parse_options > * @sb: The ecryptfs super block > @@ -264,14 +266,13 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options) > case ecryptfs_opt_sig: > case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_sig: > sig_src = args[0].from; > - sig_dst = > - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig; > - memcpy(sig_dst, sig_src, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX); > - sig_dst[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX] = '\0'; > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, > - "The mount_crypt_stat " > - "global_auth_tok_sig set to: " > - "[%s]\n", sig_dst); > + rc = ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(mount_crypt_stat, > + sig_src); > + if (rc) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register " > + "global sig; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > + goto out; > + } > sig_set = 1; > break; > case ecryptfs_opt_debug: > @@ -358,55 +359,21 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options) > if (!cipher_key_bytes_set) { > mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size = 0; > } > - rc = ecryptfs_process_cipher( > - &mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm, > - mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name, > - &mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size); > - if (rc) { > - printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize cipher [%s] " > - "with key size [%Zd] bytes; rc = [%d]\n", > + if ((rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm( > + NULL, mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name, > + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size))) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize cipher with " > + "name = [%s] and key size = [%d]; rc = [%d]\n", > mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name, > mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size, rc); > - mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm = NULL; > - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_key = NULL; > - rc = -EINVAL; > - goto out; > - } > - mutex_init(&mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm_mutex); > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Requesting the key with description: " > - "[%s]\n", mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig); > - /* The reference to this key is held until umount is done The > - * call to key_put is done in ecryptfs_put_super() */ > - auth_tok_key = request_key(&key_type_user, > - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig, > - NULL); > - if (!auth_tok_key || IS_ERR(auth_tok_key)) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not find key with " > - "description: [%s]\n", > - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig); > - process_request_key_err(PTR_ERR(auth_tok_key)); > rc = -EINVAL; > goto out; > } > - auth_tok = ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(auth_tok_key); > - if (ecryptfs_verify_version(auth_tok->version)) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Data structure version mismatch. " > - "Userspace tools must match eCryptfs kernel " > - "module with major version [%d] and minor " > - "version [%d]\n", ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR, > - ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR); > - rc = -EINVAL; > - goto out; > - } > - if (auth_tok->token_type != ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD > - && auth_tok->token_type != ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Invalid auth_tok structure " > - "returned from key query\n"); > - rc = -EINVAL; > - goto out; > + if ((rc = ecryptfs_init_global_auth_toks(mount_crypt_stat))) { > + printk(KERN_WARNING "One or more global auth toks could not " > + "properly register; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > } > - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_key = auth_tok_key; > - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok = auth_tok; > + rc = 0; > out: > return rc; > } > -- > 1.5.1.6 > > - > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html > Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
|  |