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    SubjectRe: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

    > >What you do with AppArmor, instead of addressing the problem, is just
    > >redefine the environment along the lines of "set your house into a rock
    > >wall so there is only one path to it".
    > Harrumph. Those analogies sound good but aren't a very good guide.
    > Let's take a concrete example. Consider the following fragment of a
    > policy for Mozilla:
    > allow ~/.mozilla
    > deny ~
    > Ignore the syntax; the goal is to allow Mozilla to access files under
    > ~/.mozilla but nothing else under my home directory. This is a perfectly
    > reasonable policy fragment to want to enforce. And enforcing it in
    > the obvious way using pathname-based access control is not a ridiculous
    > thing to do.

    Unfortunately, mozilla needs temporary files IIRC. And when you add
    allow /tmp

    to your config files, you get system where your fellow users can
    ln HOME/.ssh/identity /tmp/to-steal (or
    ln HOME/.profile /tmp/put-evil-code-here)
    and AA protection is not effective any more.

    Would _you_ do this mistake?

    Would our users do this mistake?

    Is it right to provide them with auto-learning tools to make this
    mistake really easy?

    (cesky, pictures)
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