Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 22 Jun 2007 13:37:27 +0200 | From | Lars Marowsky-Bree <> | Subject | Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching |
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On 2007-06-22T07:19:39, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> > > Or can access the data under a different path to which their profile > > > does give them access, whether in its final destination or in some > > > temporary file processed along the way. > > Well, yes. That is intentional. > > > > Your point is? > > It may very well be unintentional access, especially when taking into > account wildcards in profiles and user-writable directories.
Again, you're saying that AA is not confining unconfined processes. That's a given. If unconfined processes assist confined processes in breeching their confinement, yes, that is not mediated.
You're basically saying that anything but system-wide mandatory access control is pointless.
If you want to go down that route, what is your reply to me saying that SELinux cannot mediate NFS mounts - if the server is not confined using SELinux as well? The argument is really, really moot and pointless. Yes, unconfined actions can affect confined processes.
That's generally true for _any_ security system.
> > That is an interesting argument, but not what we're discussing here. > > We're arguing filesystem access mediation. > IOW, anything that AA cannot protect against is "out of scope". An easy > escape from any criticism.
I'm quite sure that this reply is not AA specific as you try to make it appear.
> > Yes. Your use case is different than mine. > My use case is being able to protect data reliably. Yours?
I want to restrict certain possibly untrusted applications and network-facing services from accessing certain file patterns, because as a user and admin, that's the mindset I'm used to. I might be interested in mediating other channels too, but the files are what I really care about. I'm inclined to trust the other processes.
Your use case mandates complete system-wide mediation, because you want full data flow analysis. Mine doesn't.
Regards, Lars
-- Teamlead Kernel, SuSE Labs, Research and Development SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, GF: Markus Rex, HRB 16746 (AG Nürnberg) "Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes." -- Oscar Wilde
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