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    SubjectRe: AppArmor FAQ
    > For SELinux to be effective it has to have a complete policy definition.
    > This would prevent the OpenOffice access (unless OpenOffice is in the
    > modify_resolv_conf_t domain) above.

    This would mean no fully functional root user anymore. My understanding
    is rather that at least in the Fedora default setup individual applications
    are confined with targetted policy and root left alone because normal system
    administrators get very unhappy when root becomes powerless.

    I was merely pointing out that in this setup path or namespace based access
    control are much easier to fit in than label based access because they normally
    don't require changing applications. John's original document also
    listed some other advantages that I don't need to repeat.

    In "i don't care if it looks like Unix anymore" security setups like
    you're describing that's undoubtedly different and labels might indeed
    work because you forbid just anybody changing them easily. If that makes
    the users happy is a different question though. I suppose it will
    keep security consultants employed at least @)

    Arguably the preserving label issue is not unique to SELinux but
    also applies to ACLs and other possible uses of EAs, but then people normally
    don't need to set any ACLs on /etc/resolv.conf.

    I personally don't like either too much. Path based access control
    is somewhat hackish and ugly and slow in the current implementation,
    but I haven't seen an similarly easy to configure solution yet.

    plan9 like limited namespaces for individual processes initially seem
    like a nice alternative, but in practice they're also too hard to use and
    suffer from many of the problems the EA label approach has.

    But easy to use security is probably better than complicated security
    because normal people will more likely use it.


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