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    SubjectRe: [AppArmor 00/41] AppArmor security module overview

    > AppArmor's Overall Design
    > =========================
    > AppArmor protects systems from vulnerable software by confining
    > processes, giving them "least privilege" access to the system's
    > resources: with least privilege, processes are allowed exactly what they
    > need, nothing more, and nothing less. Systems are thus protected from
    > bugs in applications that would lead to privilege escalation, such as
    > remote system access because of a buffer overflow in a web server, etc.
    > AppArmor does this by defining application profiles which list allowed
    > accesses, and assigning those profiles to processes. AppArmor does *not*

    You can do the same with ptrace. If that's not fast enough... improve

    > The corollary to this is that attacks against AppArmor that start with
    > "assume some unconfined process does ..." are outside the AppArmor
    > threat model. Any process that might do something malicious to an

    IOW AppArmor is broken by design. (One reason is: operations by unconfined
    processes that did not use to be security sensitive before -- ln
    shadow random_name -- are security sensitive now.)

    (cesky, pictures)
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      Last update: 2007-04-12 22:01    [W:0.021 / U:2.304 seconds]
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