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SubjectRe: [AppArmor 00/41] AppArmor security module overview
jjohansen@suse.de wrote:
> This post contains patches to include the AppArmor application security
> framework, with request for inclusion.

question in general, these seems like a fairly invasive series of
patches. back when I first started graduate school, I prototyped a
relatively simple stackable file system on 2.4 that seems to be able to
do a lot of what app armor does (or at least seems to be easily
extensible to o everything app armor does) from an fs perspective,
without having to modify the kernel at all, why not use that approach?

What I did back then was I took Erez Zadok's fist, created his base0fs,
which basically does nothing, just passes everything directly down. I
viewed it as a null stackable fs. I then modified it to

a) contain a set of rules (be able to add, delete, modify them)

b) fs's private lookup() determines if a dentry matches a rule and tags
it (stored in dentry private data, but inode can be used as well)

c) fs's private permission() checks the rule data stored in private data
to determine if the generic_permission should be even called.

what I didn't do is mmap or hard link, but those are additional checks
one can do in those specific f_ops.

Basically, why force the VFS to change, when one can create an
apparmorfs that stacks on top of whatever fs you want to use app armor
rules with, create a namespace containing that new stacked fs only (to
contain processes within the stacked fs).

This approach doesn't suffer from the normal stackable file system
"issue" since there should be no complex what I'll call "cache
coherency" issues due to the stackable "directory entry" namespace being
the same exact as the underlying namespace and it passing down page
cache operations directly to the lower fs. So one could stack on top of
a file system one is using for both apparmor protected and unprotected
processes.

I could imagine there might be an issue w/ how one deals with special
file systems (ala proc and others). But the way we approached this in
general, is that this is an aspect of containers. namely, each protected
area is a container itself, and hence has its own private virtualized
proc....
my code was mostly prototype level (As well as only for 2.4), but it
would seem to very easily to duplicate in a production level quailty for
2.6.

anyways, just a thought
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