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On Sat, Mar 24, 2007 at 10:35:37AM +0530, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote:
> > +static int ns_create(struct container_subsys *ss, struct container *cont)
> > +{> > + struct nscont *ns;> > +> > + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))> > + return -EPERM;> > Does this check break existing namespace semantics in a subtle way?
> It now requires that unshare() of namespaces by any task requires
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN capabilities.
I should clarify that I am referring to unshare thr' clone here (and not
thr' sys_unshare)
> clone(.., CLONE_NEWUTS, ..)->copy_namespaces()->ns_container_clone()->
> ->container_clone()-> .. -> container_create() -> ns_create()
>
> Earlier, one could unshare his uts namespace w/o CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> capabilities. Now it is required. Is that fine? Don't know.
>
> I feel we can avoid this check totally and let the directory permissions
> take care of these checks.
>
> Serge, what do you think?
--
Regards,
vatsa
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