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SubjectRe: [PATCH] proc: maps protection
The /proc/pid/ "maps", "smaps", and "numa_maps" files contain sensitive 
information about the memory location and usage of processes. Issues:

- maps should not be world-readable, especially if programs expect any
kind of ASLR protection from local attackers.
- maps cannot just be 0400 because "-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -O2" makes glibc
check the maps when %n is in a *printf call, and a setuid(getuid())
process wouldn't be able to read its own maps file. (For reference
see http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/1/22/150)
- a system-wide toggle is needed to allow prior behavior in the case of
non-root applications that depend on access to the maps contents.

This change implements a check using "ptrace_may_attach" before allowing
access to read the maps contents. To control this protection, the new
knob /proc/sys/kernel/maps_protect has been added, with corresponding
updates to the procfs documentation.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net>
---
CREDITS | 2 +-
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt | 7 +++++++
fs/proc/base.c | 3 +++
fs/proc/internal.h | 2 ++
fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
fs/proc/task_nommu.c | 6 ++++++
include/linux/sysctl.h | 1 +
kernel/sysctl.c | 9 +++++++++
8 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
---
diff --git a/CREDITS b/CREDITS
index 6bd8ab8..38c3ada 100644
--- a/CREDITS
+++ b/CREDITS
@@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ N: Kees Cook
E: kees@outflux.net
W: http://outflux.net/
P: 1024D/17063E6D 9FA3 C49C 23C9 D1BC 2E30 1975 1FFF 4BA9 1706 3E6D
-D: Minor updates to SCSI code for the Communications type
+D: Minor updates to SCSI types, added /proc/pid/maps protection
S: (ask for current address)
S: USA

diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
index 5484ab5..d9b06b5 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
@@ -1137,6 +1137,13 @@ determine whether or not they are still functioning properly.
Because the NMI watchdog shares registers with oprofile, by disabling the NMI
watchdog, oprofile may have more registers to utilize.

+maps_protect
+------------
+
+Enables/Disables the protection of the per-process proc entries "maps" and
+"smaps". When enabled, the contents of these files are visible only to
+readers that are allowed to ptrace() the given process.
+

2.4 /proc/sys/vm - The virtual memory subsystem
-----------------------------------------------
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 01f7769..6feccbc 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -123,6 +123,9 @@ struct pid_entry {
NULL, &proc_info_file_operations, \
{ .proc_read = &proc_##OTYPE } )

+int maps_protect = 0;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(maps_protect);
+
static struct fs_struct *get_fs_struct(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct fs_struct *fs;
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index c932aa6..2c65b6e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ do { \
extern int nommu_vma_show(struct seq_file *, struct vm_area_struct *);
#endif

+extern int maps_protect;
+
extern void create_seq_entry(char *name, mode_t mode, const struct file_operations *f);
extern int proc_exe_link(struct inode *, struct dentry **, struct vfsmount **);
extern int proc_tid_stat(struct task_struct *, char *);
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index 7445980..45a0f3e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -134,6 +134,9 @@ static int show_map_internal(struct seq_file *m, void *v, struct mem_size_stats
dev_t dev = 0;
int len;

+ if (maps_protect && !ptrace_may_attach(task))
+ return -EACCES;
+
if (file) {
struct inode *inode = vma->vm_file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
@@ -444,11 +447,22 @@ const struct file_operations proc_maps_operations = {
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
extern int show_numa_map(struct seq_file *m, void *v);

+static int show_numa_map_checked(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+ struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
+ struct task_struct *task = priv->task;
+
+ if (maps_protect && !ptrace_may_attach(task))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ return show_numa_map(m, v);
+}
+
static struct seq_operations proc_pid_numa_maps_op = {
.start = m_start,
.next = m_next,
.stop = m_stop,
- .show = show_numa_map
+ .show = show_numa_map_checked
};

static int numa_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_nommu.c b/fs/proc/task_nommu.c
index 7cddf6b..c2747c9 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_nommu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_nommu.c
@@ -143,6 +143,12 @@ out:
static int show_map(struct seq_file *m, void *_vml)
{
struct vm_list_struct *vml = _vml;
+ struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
+ struct task_struct *task = priv->task;
+
+ if (maps_protect && !ptrace_may_attach(task))
+ return -EACCES;
+
return nommu_vma_show(m, vml->vma);
}

diff --git a/include/linux/sysctl.h b/include/linux/sysctl.h
index 2c5fb38..608a331 100644
--- a/include/linux/sysctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ enum
KERN_MAX_LOCK_DEPTH=74,
KERN_NMI_WATCHDOG=75, /* int: enable/disable nmi watchdog */
KERN_PANIC_ON_NMI=76, /* int: whether we will panic on an unrecovered */
+ KERN_MAPS_PROTECT=77, /* int: whether we protect maps from public visibility */
};


diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 1b255df..ca4d69f 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ extern int pid_max_min, pid_max_max;
extern int sysctl_drop_caches;
extern int percpu_pagelist_fraction;
extern int compat_log;
+extern int maps_protect;

/* this is needed for the proc_dointvec_minmax for [fs_]overflow UID and GID */
static int maxolduid = 65535;
@@ -603,6 +604,14 @@ static ctl_table kern_table[] = {
.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
},
#endif
+ {,
+ .ctl_name = KERN_MAPS_PROTECT,
+ .procname = "maps_protect",
+ .data = &maps_protect,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+ },

{ .ctl_name = 0 }
};


--
Kees Cook
-
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