Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 01 Feb 2007 18:16:38 +0300 | From | Kirill Korotaev <> | Subject | Re: [Devel] [RFC] Allow access to /proc/$PID/fd after setuid() |
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Acked-By: Kirill Korotaev <dev@openvz.org>
> /proc/$PID/fd has r-x------ permissions, so if process does setuid(), it > will not be able to access /proc/*/fd/. This breaks fstatat() emulation > in glibc. > > open("foo", O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY) = 4 > setuid32(65534) = 0 > stat64("/proc/self/fd/4/bar", 0xbfafb298) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied) > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@openvz.org> > --- > > fs/proc/base.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) > > --- a/fs/proc/base.c > +++ b/fs/proc/base.c > @@ -1413,11 +1413,27 @@ static struct file_operations proc_fd_op > .readdir = proc_readfd, > }; > > +static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd) > +{ > + struct task_struct *tsk; > + int rv; > + > + rv = generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL); > + if (rv == 0) > + return 0; > + tsk = get_proc_task(inode); > + if (tsk == current) > + rv = 0; > + put_task_struct(tsk); > + return rv; > +} > + > /* > * proc directories can do almost nothing.. > */ > static struct inode_operations proc_fd_inode_operations = { > .lookup = proc_lookupfd, > + .permission = proc_fd_permission, > .setattr = proc_setattr, > }; > > > _______________________________________________ > Devel mailing list > Devel@openvz.org > https://openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel >
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