Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [patch 1/2] [RFC] Simple tamper-proof device filesystem. | From | Tetsuo Handa <> | Date | Tue, 18 Dec 2007 11:26:21 +0900 |
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Hello.
Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > But your requirements are to ensure that an application accessing a > device at a well-known location get what it expect.
Yes. That's the purpose of this filesystem.
> So then the main quesiton is still the one I think Al had asked - what > keeps a rogue CAP_SYS_MOUNT process from doing > mount --bind /dev/hda1 /dev/null ?
Excuse me, but I guess you meant "mount --bind /dev/ /root/" or something because mount operation requires directories. MAC can prevent a rogue CAP_SYS_MOUNT process from doing "mount --bind /dev/ /root/". For example, regarding TOMOYO Linux, you need to give "allow_mount /dev/ /root/ --bind 0" permission to permit "mount --bind /dev/ /root/" request.
Did you mean "ln -s /dev/hda1 /dev/null" or "ln /dev/hda1 /dev/null"? No problem. MAC can prevent such requests too.
Regards.
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