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Hi! > > If attacker already has priviledge foo, he can just go use it. He does > > not have to exec() poor program not expecting to get priviledge foo, > > then abusing it. > > It is not about attackers. It is about normal usage. If you spawn a program, > it might behave wrong since it does not know that it is priveledged. For > example a network daemon might start a child process which interacts with > the user, and forgets to drop priveldges for it. Ok, something like that is possible, at least it is not a security problem. > > Sanitized here means "all regular capabilities set, all others > > cleared". > > Yes, however I thought this was exactly what the patch is not doing? Yep, it needs to be fixed ;-). Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ | ||||||||||||
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