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>> In the meantime, so long as you're adding some new capabilities, how >> about also splitting up a few like CAP_SYS_ADMIN? Have you looked into >> it and decided none are really separable, i.e. any subset leads to the >> ability to get any other subset? > >I agree that splitting CAP_SYS_ADMIN might be worth while, but it >really looks like opening a worm can, so I didn't feel up to the >challenge there. It might be a good idea to reserve some bits for >that possibility, however - I'm not sure how best to proceed. Split it into read and write options, for a start. This is important in a sub-"root"-user environment as is currently created with my MultiAdm LSM, which, due to the broad spectrum CAP_SYS_ADMIN addresses, must give SYS_ADMIN to the subadmin (to be able to read restricted objects) and restrict it afterwards in all the LSM hooks (to not write to restricted objects). http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/5/1/105 http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/5/1/110 <- important Jan Engelhardt -- - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ | ||||||||||||
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