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Edgar Toernig writes:
> Bjvrn Steinbrink wrote:
>> In do_revoke() there is:
>>
>> + if (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid && !capable(CAP_FOWNER)) {
>> + ret = -EPERM;
>> + goto out;
>>
>> That pretty much matches what the BSD manpage says.
>
> Urgs, so any user may remove mappings from another process and
> let it crash?
Two good solutions come to mind:
a. substitute the zero page
b. make the mapping private and touch it as if C-O-W happened
Other concerns:
Optionally excluding the current UID/TGID/TID would be good.
(some flags) A revokeat() call seems to be required. Be sure
to handle working directories. The controlling tty is special.
Flag processes with revoked ttys in /proc/*/stat please, so
that ps can report it properly without opening another file.
BTW, it is wonderful to see this happening.
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