Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 14 Jul 2006 01:11:18 +0200 | From | andrea@cpushare ... | Subject | Re: [2.6 patch] let CONFIG_SECCOMP default to n |
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On Thu, Jul 13, 2006 at 09:29:41PM +0000, Pavel Machek wrote: > Actually random delays are unlike to help (much). You have just added > noise, but you can still decode original signal...
You're wrong, the random delays added to every packet will definitely wipe out any signal.
But regardless of what is the best fix for the network attack I quote Ingo:
correct. But when i suggested to do precisely that i got a rant from Andrea of how super duper important it was to disable the TSC for seccomp ... (which argument is almost total hogwash)
Now if the availability of the nanosecond precision of the TSC is almost total hogwash, how can the network attack be a real concern?
Either the NOTSC feature is critically important (and I don't think it is but it's not total hogwash either), or the network attach is an absolute red-herring.
You can't get it both ways. It can't be the NOTSC isn't needed but the network attack is a serious concern.
What is currently shocking me is that if you really think the network attack isn't an absolute red-herring, then it's very weird you're answering to my email instead of answering to Ingo when he says the availability of the TSC is almost total hogwash.
And please feel free to demonstrate the network attack, remote seccomp computations are already possible so if you want to start listening to a signal you can. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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