Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | Date | Wed, 21 Jun 2006 17:37:59 -0400 (EDT) | From | James Morris <> | Subject | [PATCH 3/3] SELinux: Add sockcreate node to procattr API |
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From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
(Unchanged from eariler post).
Below is a patch to add a new /proc/self/attr/sockcreate A process may write a context into this interface and all subsequent sockets created will be labeled with that context. This is the same idea as the fscreate interface where a process can specify the label of a file about to be created. At this time one envisioned user of this will be xinetd. It will be able to better label sockets for the actual services. At this time all sockets take the label of the creating process, so all xinitd sockets would just be labeled the same.
I tested this by creating a tcp sender and listener. The sender was able to write to this new proc file and then create sockets with the specified label. I am able to be sure the new label was used since the avc denial messages kicked out by the kernel included both the new security permission setsockcreate and all the socket denials were for the new label, not the label of the running process.
This patch is targeted for inclusion in 2.6.18.
Please apply.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 6 ++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++----- security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff -purN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.17-mm1.p/fs/proc/base.c linux-2.6.17-mm1.w/fs/proc/base.c --- linux-2.6.17-mm1.p/fs/proc/base.c 2006-06-21 11:54:10.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.6.17-mm1.w/fs/proc/base.c 2006-06-21 12:51:28.000000000 -0400 @@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ enum pid_directory_inos { PROC_TGID_ATTR_EXEC, PROC_TGID_ATTR_FSCREATE, PROC_TGID_ATTR_KEYCREATE, + PROC_TGID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE, #endif #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL PROC_TGID_LOGINUID, @@ -175,6 +176,7 @@ enum pid_directory_inos { PROC_TID_ATTR_EXEC, PROC_TID_ATTR_FSCREATE, PROC_TID_ATTR_KEYCREATE, + PROC_TID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE, #endif #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL PROC_TID_LOGINUID, @@ -292,6 +294,7 @@ static struct pid_entry tgid_attr_stuff[ E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_EXEC, "exec", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_FSCREATE, "fscreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_KEYCREATE, "keycreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), + E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE, "sockcreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), {0,0,NULL,0} }; static struct pid_entry tid_attr_stuff[] = { @@ -300,6 +303,7 @@ static struct pid_entry tid_attr_stuff[] E(PROC_TID_ATTR_EXEC, "exec", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), E(PROC_TID_ATTR_FSCREATE, "fscreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), E(PROC_TID_ATTR_KEYCREATE, "keycreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), + E(PROC_TID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE, "sockcreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), {0,0,NULL,0} }; #endif @@ -1765,6 +1769,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_pident_lookup case PROC_TGID_ATTR_FSCREATE: case PROC_TID_ATTR_KEYCREATE: case PROC_TGID_ATTR_KEYCREATE: + case PROC_TID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE: + case PROC_TGID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE: inode->i_fop = &proc_pid_attr_operations; break; #endif diff -purN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.17-mm1.p/security/selinux/hooks.c linux-2.6.17-mm1.w/security/selinux/hooks.c --- linux-2.6.17-mm1.p/security/selinux/hooks.c 2006-06-21 12:42:51.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.6.17-mm1.w/security/selinux/hooks.c 2006-06-21 12:54:26.000000000 -0400 @@ -1532,8 +1532,9 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(str /* Default to the current task SID. */ bsec->sid = tsec->sid; - /* Reset create SID on execve. */ + /* Reset create and sockcreate SID on execve. */ tsec->create_sid = 0; + tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; if (tsec->exec_sid) { newsid = tsec->exec_sid; @@ -2585,9 +2586,10 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc_security(s tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid; tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid; - /* Retain the exec and create SIDs across fork */ + /* Retain the exec, create, and sock SIDs across fork */ tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid; tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid; + tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid; /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any. This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any @@ -2937,12 +2939,14 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int fam { int err = 0; struct task_security_struct *tsec; + u32 newsid; if (kern) goto out; tsec = current->security; - err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, + newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid; + err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); @@ -2955,12 +2959,14 @@ static void selinux_socket_post_create(s { struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct task_security_struct *tsec; + u32 newsid; isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; tsec = current->security; + newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid; isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); - isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : tsec->sid; + isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid; isec->initialized = 1; return; @@ -4163,6 +4169,8 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct ta sid = tsec->create_sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) sid = tsec->keycreate_sid; + else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) + sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid; else return -EINVAL; @@ -4197,6 +4205,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct ta error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE); else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE); + else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) + error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE); else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT); else @@ -4231,7 +4241,9 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct ta if (error) return error; tsec->keycreate_sid = sid; - } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) { + } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) + tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid; + else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) { struct av_decision avd; if (sid == 0) diff -purN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.17-mm1.p/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h linux-2.6.17-mm1.w/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h --- linux-2.6.17-mm1.p/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h 2006-06-21 11:54:12.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.6.17-mm1.w/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h 2006-06-21 12:57:36.000000000 -0400 @@ -468,6 +468,7 @@ #define PROCESS__EXECSTACK 0x04000000UL #define PROCESS__EXECHEAP 0x08000000UL #define PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE 0x10000000UL +#define PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE 0x20000000UL #define IPC__CREATE 0x00000001UL #define IPC__DESTROY 0x00000002UL diff -purN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.17-mm1.p/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h linux-2.6.17-mm1.w/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h --- linux-2.6.17-mm1.p/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h 2006-06-21 11:54:12.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.6.17-mm1.w/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h 2006-06-21 12:58:58.000000000 -0400 @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECSTACK, "execstack") S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECHEAP, "execheap") S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, "setkeycreate") + S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, "setsockcreate") S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, "enqueue") S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, "send") S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, "receive") diff -purN -X dontdiff linux-2.6.17-mm1.p/security/selinux/include/objsec.h linux-2.6.17-mm1.w/security/selinux/include/objsec.h --- linux-2.6.17-mm1.p/security/selinux/include/objsec.h 2006-06-21 11:54:12.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.6.17-mm1.w/security/selinux/include/objsec.h 2006-06-21 12:58:07.000000000 -0400 @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ struct task_security_struct { u32 exec_sid; /* exec SID */ u32 create_sid; /* fscreate SID */ u32 keycreate_sid; /* keycreate SID */ + u32 sockcreate_sid; /* fscreate SID */ u32 ptrace_sid; /* SID of ptrace parent */ }; - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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