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SubjectRe: [PATCH 2.6.17-rc4 1/6] Base support for kmemleak

* Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@gmail.com> wrote:

> A problem I'm facing (also because I'm not familiar with the other
> architectures) is detecting the effective stack boundaries of the
> threads running or waiting in kernel mode. Scanning the whole stack
> (8K) hides some possible leaks (because of no longer used local
> variables) and not scanning the list at all can lead to false
> positives. I would need to investigate this a bit more.

i was thinking about this too, and i wanted to suggest a different
solution here: you could build a list of "temporary" objects that only
get registered with the memleak proper once a thread exits a system call
(or once a kernel thread goes back to its main loop). This means a
(lightweight) callback in the syscall exit (or irq exit) path. This way
you'd not have to scan kernel stacks at all, only .data and the objects
themselves.

the stack boundary rules can be quite complex: for example on x86_64 you
can have a pretty complex nesting of exception, interrupt and process
stacks. In fact on SMP we dont even know the precise stack boundary for
tasks that are running on some other CPU. [because we have no snapshot
of their register state]

avoiding the scanning of the kernel stacks gets rid of some of the
biggest source of natural entropy. (they contain strings and all sorts
of other binary data that could accidentally match up with a kernel
pointer)

Ingo
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