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SubjectRe: [RFC][PATCH 0/11] security: AppArmor - Overview
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On Fri, 2006-04-21 at 10:30 -0700, Chris Wright wrote:
> * Stephen Smalley (sds@tycho.nsa.gov) wrote:
> > Difficult to evaluate, when the answer whenever a flaw is pointed out is
> > "that's not in our threat model." Easy enough to have a protection
> > model match the threat model when the threat model is highly limited
> > (and never really documented anywhere, particularly in a way that might
> > warn its users of its limitations).
>
> I know, there's two questions. Whether the protection model is valid,
> and whether the threat model is worth considering. So far, I've not
> seen anything that's compelling enough to show AppArmor fundamentally
> broken. Ugly and inefficient, yes...broken, not yet.

Access control of any form requires unambiguous identification of
subjects and objects in the system. Paths don't achieve such
identification. Is that broken enough? If not, what is? What
qualifies as broken?

--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

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